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THE ROLE AND IMPACT OF THE EU’S COMMON 
FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS THE 
WESTERN BALKANS (2001-2006)
Steven Blockmans*
Summary: In the period from 2001 to 2006, the Western Balkans 
served as a testing ground for the development of the EU’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. This paper explores a variety of legal and 
political aspects of the EU’s efforts to stabilise the Western Balkans 
in an attempt to answer the question about what the EU should have 
learned in so doing. Attention is paid to the diplomatic efforts of the 
EU to prevent (the escalation of) confl ict in Macedonia, between Ser-
bia and Montenegro, and in Kosovo. The role and impact of the EU’s 
fi rst-ever - and so far biggest - police and military operations are also 
evaluated. It is argued that lessons learned from these actions should 
be taken to heart before the EU decides to embark on any future mis-
sions. Otherwise, history may prove that the Western Balkans offered 
the EU’s one and only chance to develop credible and lasting foreign 
policy, security, and defence arrangements.
1. The gradual development of CFSP/ESDP
Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht, the Member 
States of the European Union have actively used the diplomatic struc-
tures with which they had endowed “their” Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP). Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, Javi-
er Solana, Secretary General/High Representative for the CFSP (SG/HR), 
supported by his staff at the Council, has made the most of the cautious 
wording of his tasks in Article 26 TEU. In the Western Balkans, the Euro-
pean Union, by way of its SG/HR, was instrumental in brokering a peace 
deal between the government and the Albanian separatists in Macedonia 
(2001) and in hammering out the Belgrade Agreement (2002) to prevent 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) from falling apart and having a 
knock-on effect on the precarious balance reached in Kosovo.1 The ques-
tion remains, however, whether these and other diplomatic constructs 
can sustain the disintegrative forces still at work in parts of the Western 
* Senior research fellow in EU Law, T.M.C. Asser Institute, The Hague.
1 The term “Macedonia” is used here as an informal name. Greece believes that the name 
Macedonia should properly be applied to its own northern region with origins dating from 
the time of Alexander the Great. Similarly, the name “Kosovo” is used here in spite of the Al-
banian and Serb appellations for the region, respectively “Kosova” and “Kosovo-Metohija”.
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Balkans. With the peaceful separation of Serbia and Montenegro in June 
2006 and the negotiations on the fi nal status of Kosovo well underway, 
the answer to this question is highly relevant for the EU’s ongoing efforts 
to stabilise the Western Balkans.
History has shown that rogue leaders with bad intentions only un-
derstand the language of diplomacy backed by force.2 For long it has 
been clear that the EU is in need of other, more persuasive machinery to 
force parties (that have the intention of) fi ghting each other in an armed 
confl ict not to commit heinous crimes such as ethnic cleansing and re-
ligious persecution, and to settle their differences in a peaceful manner. 
The need to move beyond the paper security structures which were in-
troduced in the Treaty on European Union during the 1991 IGC quickly 
became apparent with the violent disintegration of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) at the end of that year and the ensuing 
war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1995). In the absence of its own secu-
rity and defence capabilities, the European Union could avail itself of the 
Western European Union (WEU) to elaborate and implement decisions 
and actions of the Council which had “defence” implications.3 The word 
“defence” was to be interpreted in the broad sense, since it explicitly did 
not include a common defence of the territory of the EU. The term re-
ferred to military cooperation in actions “out-of-area”. Reviewing the sig-
nifi cant changes that had taken place in the security situation in Europe 
after the outbreak of the Yugoslav crisis, the WEU Council of Ministers, 
at its 19 June 1992 meeting in Petersberg (near Bonn), redefi ned its op-
erational role so as to include the deployment of military units of WEU 
Member States for “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks 
and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemak-
ing” to implement confl ict prevention or crisis management measures 
taken within the framework of the OSCE or the UN.4 While military units 
2 See, eg, R Holbrooke, To End a War (Random House, New York 1998) 146.
3 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) [in subsequent footnotes TEU] art J.4(2). See 
also Council document on the Relations between the Union and the WEU, EU Bull 10-1993 
adopted by the Council of the EU on 26 October 1993 and accepted by the WEU Council of 
Ministers on 22 November 1993, and as Document 1412 of the Assembly of the WEU, 8 April 
1994. For more details on the legal relationship between the two international organisations, 
see R Wessel, ‘The EU as a Black Widow: Devouring the WEU to Give Birth to a European 
Security and Defence Policy’ in V Kronenberger (ed), The European Union and the International 
Legal Order: Discord or Harmony? (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague 2001) 405-434.
4 The WEU Declaration of 19 June 1992 is reproduced in C Hill and K Smith, European 
Foreign Policy: Key Documents (Routledge, London 2000) 205-211. On the question whether 
the WEU, in extending its original collective defence task to completely new functions, was 
acting ultra vires, see R Wessel, ‘The Legality of the New Functions of the Western European 
Union: The Attribution of Powers Reconsidered on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary 
of the Brussels Treaty’ in A Deighton and E Remacle (eds), The Western European Union, 
1948-1998: From the Brussels Treaty to the Treaty of Amsterdam (1-2 Studia Diplomatica, 
1998) 15-28. 
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of the ten WEU Member States, all also EU Member States, conducted 
operations in the Adriatic5 and on the Danube,6 they did not do so in 
support of decisions taken by the European Union. The only request of 
the EU in the fi rst half of the nineties to make use of WEU capabilities 
in the Western Balkans concerned the support for the EU administration 
of the Bosnian town of Mostar (1994).7 Unfortunately, this operation was 
generally perceived a failure, especially by the parties to the confl ict.8 
With the crises in Albania (1997) and Kosovo (1999), the European Union 
was further embarrassed at how little it could contribute to the preven-
tion and/or “management” of confl icts at its doorstep. Reliance upon US 
diplomacy and NATO’s military strength condemned the Union to paying 
the bills, while not moving the emphasis to short-term confl ict prevention 
and crisis management.
Frustration at such inadequacies and calls for change by others, no-
tably the US, led France and the United Kingdom, the EU Member States 
that pack most military punch, to prod their colleagues at the European 
Council’s December 1999 summit at Helsinki in carrying forward work 
on the development of the Union’s own military (and non-military) crisis 
management capability with the objective of a strengthened and credible 
European policy on security and defence.9 At its meeting in Helsinki the 
5 See <http://www.weu.int>. In July 1992, the WEU Ministerial Council decided that WEU 
naval forces would participate in monitoring the UN embargo against former Yugoslavia in 
the Adriatic. NATO was also conducting its own operation at the time. On 8 June 1993, the 
WEU and NATO Councils met to approve a combined concept for “Operation Sharp Guard” 
in support of UN Security Council Resolution 820 (1993). 
6 Ibid Following an extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers in Luxembourg 
on 5 April 1993, it was agreed that WEU Member States would provide assistance to Bul-
garia, Hungary and Romania in their efforts to enforce the UN sanctions on the Danube. In 
June 1993, the three riparian states accepted this offer and agreed with WEU on the set-
ting-up of a police and customs operation.
7 Ibid The request of the Council was not presented in an offi cial decision. The cooperation 
was not based on TEU art J.4(2) since no defence issues were involved. See J-F Paganon, 
‘Western European Union’s Pivotal Position Between the Atlantic Alliance and the Euro-
pean Union’ in A Deighton (ed), Western European Union 1954-1997: Defence, Security, 
Integration (European Independent research Unit, Oxford 1997) 93-102, at 97. Three later 
requests of the EU for WEU support pursuant to TEU art J.4(2) concerned: the clearance of 
landmines in Croatia; the general security surveillance of the Kosovo region; and the provi-
sion of advice to and training instructors of the Albanian police. For more on each of these 
operations, see S Blockmans, Tough Love: the European Union’s Relations with the Western 
Balkans (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague 2007) forthcoming.
8 For critical assessments of the EU’s performance in Mostar, see eg S Orucevi , ‘Mostar: 
Europe’s Failure’ (1996) 15 Bosnia Report and S Markotich, ‘Pursuing Balkan Peace’ (1996) 
30 OMRI Special Report.
9 As a result of a meeting between French President Jacques Chirac and British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair at Saint-Malo, a joint Franco-British declaration on European defence 
was issued on 4 December 1998, stating that “[t]he Union must have the capacity for au-
tonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them 
and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.” The joint declaration 
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European Council underlined its determination to develop an autono-
mous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole was not 
engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response 
to international crises.10 To this end, the European Council agreed that:
by the year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily, [Member States] 
will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the 
full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, 
including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up 
to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons). These forces should be 
militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and 
intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and 
additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. Member States 
should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and 
within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and 
deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to sustain such 
a deployment for at least one year. This will require an additional 
pool of deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readi-
ness to provide replacements for the initial forces.11
This so-called “common European headline goal” represented a po-
litical commitment by the Member States to develop a Rapid Reaction 
Force and to progressively improve the Union’s military capabilities for 
crisis management operations. In subsequent steps, the European Coun-
cil agreed to the institution of new political and military bodies, struc-
tures, and procedures to be established within the Council to ensure 
political guidance and strategic direction;12 the principles for consulta-
tion and cooperation with non-European allies and NATO in crisis man-
agement;13 measures to enhance the Union’s civilian capabilities in the 
is reproduced in C Hill and K Smith, European Foreign Policy: Key Documents (Routledge, 
London 2000) 243-244.
10 The WEU Council facilitated this ambition by the EU by deciding “to prepare the WEU 
legacy and the inclusion of those functions of the WEU, which will be deemed necessary by 
the EU to fulfi l its new responsibilities in the area of crisis-management tasks.” See WEU 
Ministerial Council, Luxembourg Declaration, 23 November 1999, para 4.
11 EU Bull 12-1999, Annexes to the Presidency Conclusions, Annex 1 to Annex IV.
12 Following up on an agreement reached by the defence ministers of the EU at their informal 
meeting at Sintra on 28 February 2000, the interim structures that prepared the Political and 
Security Committee, EU Military Committee, and EU Military Staff, started their activities in 
Brussels on 1 March 2000. See EU Bull 3-2000 point I-20. In December 2000, the Council 
decided to make the interim committees permanent in the year 2001. See EU Bull 12-2000 
point I.6. The process to enhance European capabilities has recently been given a fresh im-
petus with the creation of the European Defence Agency. See Council Joint Action (CFSP) 
2004/551/ on the establishment of the European Defence Agency [2004] OJ L 245/17. See A 
Ambos, ‘The Institutionalisation of CFSP and ESDP’, in D Mahncke, A Ambos and C Reynolds 
(eds), European Foreign Policy: From Rhetoric to Reality? (Peter Lang, Brussels 2004) 165-192.
13 On the so-called “Berlin Plus” Agreement of 16 December 2002, which allows the EU to 
draw on some of NATO’s military assets in its own peacekeeping operations, see chapter 
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area of crisis management;14 the European Security Strategy (ESS), the 
fi rst comprehensive approach to security issues;15 measures to enhance 
EU military capabilities (the new Headline Goal 2010); and a timetable for 
carrying forward work on all of these issues.16
Thus, in a very short timeframe, the European Union disentangled 
itself from the WEU17 and developed what was needed to create an ability 
of its own to undertake the full range of Petersberg tasks.18 These de-
velopments found their way into the Treaty of Nice of December 2000.19 
3.2.1 below and M Reichard, ‘Some Legal Issues Concerning the EU-NATO Berlin Plus 
Agreement’ (2004) 73 Nordic JIL 37-67. More generally, see M Reichard, A Shifting Balance: 
Legal and Political Aspects of the EU-NATO Relationship (Ashgate, Aldershot 2006).
14 The June 2000 Feira European Council decided to set up a European Security and Intel-
ligence Force (ESIF) which, in time, is to consist of 5,000 well-armed police, 1,000 of them 
to be deployable within 30 days, able to carry out preventive as well as repressive actions 
in support of global peacekeeping missions. See EU Bull 6-2000, point I.8.11. Further, see 
Council Decision (CFSP) 2000/354/ setting up a Committee for civilian aspects of crisis 
management [2000] OJ L 127/1; and Council Conclusions on the Civilian Headline Goal 
2008 Press release 14960/05 (Presse 317) 12 December 2005.
15 EU Bull 12-2003, point I.32.83. The ESS, on page 8, includes the following reference to the 
Western Balkans when listing strategic objectives for the Union: “Our task is to promote a ring 
of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediter-
ranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations. The importance of this is best 
illustrated in the Balkans. Through our concerted efforts with the US, Russia, NATO and other 
international partners, the stability of the region is no longer threatened by the outbreak of major 
confl ict. The credibility of our foreign policy depends on the consolidation of our achievements 
there. The European perspective offers both a strategic objective and an incentive for reform.” 
On the ESS, see eg R Kissack, ‘The European Security Strategy: A First Appraisal’ (2004) 2 CFSP 
Forum,19-20; and S Duke, ‘The European Security Strategy in a Comparative Framework: Does 
it Make for Secure Alliances in a Better World?’,(2004) 9 EFA Rev,459-481.
16 For an overview of the Union’s efforts to build an ESDP, see eg S Blockmans ‘A New Crisis 
Manager at the Horizon - The Case of the European Union’ (2000) 13 LJIL 255-263; S Duke, 
The EU and Crisis Management: Development and Prospects (EIPA, Maastricht 2001); A 
Deighton, ‘The European Security and Defence Policy’,(2002) 40 JCMS 719-741; H Neuhold 
and E Sucharipa (eds), The CFSP/ESDP After enlargement: A Bigger EU = A Stronger EU? 
(Favorita Papers, Vienna School of International Studies 2003); N. Gnesotto (ed.), EU Secu-
rity and Defence Policy: The First Five Years (1999-2004) (Paris, EUISS 2004); S Biscop, ‘Able 
and Willing? Assessing the EU’s Capacity for Military Action’ (2004) 9 EFA Rev 509-527; 
and S Biscop (ed), E Pluribus Unum? Military Integration in the European Union (Academia 
Press, Brussels 2005).
17 With the 13 November 2000 Marseille Declaration of the WEU Council, the transfer of 
some WEU institutions (the Satellite Centre and the EUISS) was decided upon and the rou-
tine consultation mechanisms between WEU and EU and WEU and NATO were suspended. 
The EU agreed to take over the WEU institutions as well as the WEU activities which were 
still running (MAPE; the De-mining Assistance Mission to the Republic of Croatia was con-
tinued under the responsibility of Sweden until 9 May 2001, when its mandate expired). 
The WEU thus returned to the organisation that was originally set up to deal with collective 
defence matters in 1948: the Brussels Treaty Organisation. See R Wessel, (n 2).
18 The content of which had already to a great extent been codifi ed in TEU art 17(2) by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam.
19 In TEU art 17, as amended, all references to the WEU were deleted. See R Wessel, ‘The 
State of Affairs in European Security and Defence Policy: The Breakthrough in the Treaty of 
Nice’ (2003) 8 Journal of Confl ict & Security Law 265-288.
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The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was - somewhat pre-
maturely - declared operational at the European Council of Laeken on 
14 and 15 December 2001.20 The most striking manifestation - and rai-
son d’être - of this policy is the Union’s capacity to back its diplomatic 
efforts by action on the ground, i.e. its crisis management operations. 
Since 2001, the European Union has affi rmed its operational capability 
through the launching of seventeen ESDP operations, fi ve of which, so 
nearly one third of all missions, took or are still taking place in the West-
ern Balkans: EU Police Mission (since 2003) and EUFOR Althea (since 
2004) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Concordia (2003), Proxima (2003-2005) 
and EUPAT (since 2005) in Macedonia.21
This paper explores a variety of legal and political aspects of the Eu-
ropean Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy towards the West-
ern Balkans in the period from 2001 to 2006. Attention is paid to the 
diplomatic efforts of the EU to prevent or suppress violent confl icts in 
Macedonia, between Serbia and Montenegro, and in Kosovo (section 2). 
Subsequently, the role and impact of the fi ve ESDP operations that have 
been launched in the Western Balkans since 2001 are examined (section 
3). Some conclusions on the role and impact of the EU’s CFSP in the 
Western Balkans will be drawn at the end (section 4). This paper is not 
concerned with ESDP operations avant la lettre,22 nor will it deal with the 
institutional changes of the Union’s CFSP and ESDP as a result of the 
confl icts in the Western Balkans.23
20 EU Bull 12-2001, points I.5.6 and I.28. The Thessaloniki European Council of 19 and 20 
June 2003 admitted recognised shortfalls in the Union’s operational capability across the 
full range of Petersberg tasks, but considered that they could be alleviated by the further 
development of the EU’s military capabilities. See EU Bull 6-2003, point I.23.56.
21 For an up-to-date list of ESDP operations see <http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.
asp?id=268&lang=EN&mode=g>.
22 See (n 7).
23 See, ,S Duke, ‘From Amsterdam to Kosovo: Lessons for the Future of CFSP’ (1999) 2 
Eipascope 2-15; C Piana, ‘The EU’s Decision-making Process in the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy: The Case of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ (2002) 7 EFA Rev 
209-226; and P Latawski and M Smith, The Kosovo Crisis and the Evolution of post-Cold War 
European Security (Manchester University Press, Manchester 2003) in particular 120-142.
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2. Diplomatic endeavours
2.1. Coupe macédoine24
2.1.1. Protecting minority rights25
In 2001, a confl ict erupted between Albanian and Slavic Macedoni-
ans which brought the country on the brink of an outright civil war. Mac-
edonia had never really succeeded to integrate its Albanian citizens. The 
Albanian Macedonians boycotted the 1991 referendum on independence 
from the SFRY and the attendant census because the Macedonian Con-
stitution did not recognise them as a constituent nation of Macedonia.26 
In January 1992 they held a plebiscite of their own in which they opted 
for autonomy. They publicly and recurrently rejected the results of the 
1994 internationally monitored census (according to which Albanians 
made up 23 per cent of the population, amended by a later census to 26 
per cent). Many Albanians in Western Macedonia felt closer to their kith 
and kin in Kosovo than to the Macedonian state. Albanians occasionally 
accused the Slavic Macedonians of discrimination in the labour market, 
in secondary, and higher education, in expenditures on infrastructure 
(many Albanian villages still lack proper roads and are not connected to 
the national water and electricity grids), and in the public administration. 
Albanians claimed that police brutality, discriminatory legislation, and 
the exclusive use of the Macedonian language violated their human and 
civil rights. Gradually, they lost faith in the Slavic Macedonians’ will to 
accommodate their demands, however legitimate. To this, the Macedoni-
ans would retort that Albanians made up a hefty chunk of the informal 
economy, thus distorting offi cial unemployment fi gures; that Albanians 
in Western Macedonia largely did not pay taxes; that their under-repre-
sentation in state administration was due to the lack of properly qualifi ed 
and educated people; and that infrastructure all over the country was de-
crepit. Macedonians intermittently accused the Albanians of illegal con-
struction, purchases of real estate at infl ated prices, mass immigration 
from Kosovo, re-population of Macedonian villages abandoned by their 
inhabitants, ethnic cleansing by intimidation of urban neighbourhoods, 
24 A dessert of a blended combination of fresh fruit. For analyses on the history of Mac-
edonia since the break-up of Yugoslavia, see J Pettifer (ed), The New Macedonian Question 
(Palgrave, Basingstoke 2001).
25 The facts described in this section are primarily based on the Balkan Crisis Reports of the 
London-based Institute for War & Peace Reporting <http://www.iwpr.net>.
26 The Constitution of Macedonia was altered in 1989 from “(Macedonia is) the state of 
the Macedonian people and the Albanian and the Turkish minorities” to read “(Macedonia 
is) the national state of the Macedonian nation.” The Albanians demanded to be explicitly 
mentioned in the Constitution as a “Constituent Nation.” In the 1946 and 1974 constitu-
tions of the former Yugoslavia, constituent nations had the right to secede. No wonder the 
Macedonians rejected this formulation.
216 Steven Blockmans: The Role and Impact of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy...
nationalist indoctrination under the guise of religious instruction, pres-
suring other Muslims to declare themselves as Albanians, and irredent-
ism.27
On top of these simmering tensions during much of the 1990s, there 
was the growing problem of Albanian refugees from Kosovo in Macedonia 
following MiloševiÊ’s crackdown on Albanians in Kosovo and NATO’s air 
campaign of March-June 1999.28 Repeatedly, the Macedonian govern-
ment warned the international community that it could not allow more 
refugees on its soil, both for economic reasons and for fear of disrupting 
the fragile ethnic fabric of the country. In addition, there was a lot of 
evidence of massive arms smuggling activity in the Northern regions of 
Macedonia bordering Kosovo and Southern Serbia. Reports showed that 
Albanians in the Macedonian border villages were preparing themselves 
for an armed uprising.29 Finally, the international community failed to 
establish a link between the crisis of the Preševo Valley in June 1999 and 
a possible crisis in Macedonia.30 The attention of the European Union, in-
deed of the international community as a whole, was focused on Kosovo 
and Serbia, whereas Macedonia was regarded as a relatively stable coun-
try in the Western Balkans. While it is true that the European Commis-
sion, in the months preceding the crisis, was engaged in Macedonia with 
different projects, these actions did not prevent that inter-ethnic tensions 
reached fever pitch during the presidential elections of 17 November 1999 
when the late President Boris Trajkovski’s win was attributed by the op-
position to mass electoral fraud among Albanian voters.31 Over the next 
year, Macedonia continued to run on dangerously high voltage. In that 
year, the National Liberation Army (the Macedonian version of the Koso-
var Liberation Army) emerged, claiming equal rights for ethnic Albanians 
by force. There was sporadic ethnically motivated violence, in the form of 
terrorist bomb attacks.
27 See the December 2001 Progress Report of Rome-based network “Ethnobarometer”, pub-
lished online as K Balalovska, A Silj and M Zucconi, ‘Minority Politics in Southeast Europe: 
Crisis in Macedonia’ (2002) <http://www.ethnobarometer.org>.
28 Some 400,000 Kosovar refugees fl ooded into Macedonia (equal to 20 per cent of the 
population).
29 See <http://www.macedonia.org/crisis/timeline.html>. 
30 The crisis surfaced after the end of the war in Kosovo, when Serbian military and police 
forces were withdrawn from Kosovo and deployed in the Preševo Valley and when the pres-
sure of the Serbian administration on the Albanian families there increased, forcing them to 
leave a number of villages. From June 1999 onwards, thousands of Albanians fl ed, mostly 
to Kosovo and Macedonia.
31 In the eyes of some the EU was even seen as siding with the Albanians by providing sup-
port to strengthen the administrative and judicial capacities and by contributing fi nancial 
means to set up the South East Europe University in Tetovo, the fi rst offi cial university in-
stitute in Macedonia (partly) committed to the Albanian culture, language, and population. 
See <http://www.seeu.edu.mk/english/general/history.asp>.
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At the beginning of 2001, the Macedonian pressure cooker exploded. 
On 25 January, Albanian guerrillas claimed responsibility for a rocket at-
tack on a police station which left one offi cer dead and wounded another 
three. On 11 February, the fi rst sod was turned and construction of the 
disputed SEE University at Tetovo began.32 On 19 February, ethnic Alba-
nian insurgents wearing the insignia of the NLA clashed with a military 
patrol in Macedonia. Due to the increasing violence, Macedonia put its 
troops on alert along the border with Kosovo to prevent ethnic Albanian 
fi ghters from infi ltrating. Amid growing evidence that Albanian separatist 
guerrillas were using the Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) around Kosovo to 
stage incursions into both Southern Serbia and Macedonia, NATO agreed 
to start dismantling the buffer zone (Operation Eagle).33 At the fourth 
Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the South-East Europe 
Cooperation Process (SEECP), which - ironically - was held under Mac-
edonian chairmanship in Skopje on 22 February 2001, all delegates (incl. 
Javier Solana and Chris Patten, then European Commissioner for Ex-
ternal Relations) distanced themselves from the ethnic Albanian armed 
extremism and reiterated their strong attachment to the principle of in-
violability of borders, including the territorial integrity of Macedonia.34 
The European Union’s presidency delivered tough warnings to Albanian 
leaders and called on all involved “to isolate the extremists”.35 NATO Sec-
32 Construction was completed within less than 6 months. This is even more remarkable 
when one considers that the Tetovo region witnessed some of the heaviest inter-ethnic skir-
mishes between March and August of 2001. The academic year started in October 2001.
33 At the end of NATO’s air campaign against Serbia, the UN Security Council adopted 
UNSC Res 1244 (1999) which enabled NATO to deploy KFOR troops in Kosovo. Simultane-
ously, KFOR’s First Commander, Sir Michael Jackson, and the Yugoslav military authori-
ties agreed to, inter alia, the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army and police from Kosovo and 
the creation of a de-militarised, fi ve-kilometre wide Ground Safety Zone in Western Mon-
tenegro and Southern Serbia along the border of Kosovo. See P JankoviÊ and S GligorijeviÊ, 
‘Burying the Hatchet’ (Summer 2004) NATO Review. A part of the GSZ, around the village 
of Tanuševci, in the corner where the borders of Kosovo, Southern Serbia, and Macedonia 
meet, had become a sort of no-man’s land after the withdrawal of UNPREDEP, the UN’s 
successful prevention force in the country. The NLA has prospered there thanks to different 
kinds of traffi cking and other illegal activities. The pending ratifi cation by the Macedonian 
parliament of a Yugoslav-Macedonian border agreement, which had been negotiated with-
out the participation of the Albanians, was another reason for the NLA to launch an armed 
uprising. See R Detrez, Macedonië: land in de wachtkamer (Houtekiet, Antwerp 2002) 223.
34 See <http://www.seecp.gov.mk>. The SEECP represents a comprehensive framework for 
regional cooperation aimed at close cooperation with other international organisations and 
regional initiatives. Of particular importance are the UN, EU, OSCE, NATO, the Council of 
Europe, the Black Sea Initiative, SECI, CEI, and BSEC.
35 EU Bull. 1/2-2001, point 1.6.41. “The European Union urges all parties to respect the 
border demarcation agreement between the FRY and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Mac-
edonia signed in Skopje on 23 February, and reiterates its strong attachment to the princi-
ple of inviolability of borders, including the territorial integrity of the Former Yugoslav Re-
public of Macedonia. A peaceful and stable Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - within 
internationally recognised borders - is an important condition for furthering the integration 
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retary General George Robertson called the rebels “a bunch of murderous 
thugs whose objective is to destroy a democratic Macedonia and who are 
using civilians as human shields” in a cynical bid to provoke “another 
Balkan bloodbath.”36 Strengthened by the international disapproval of 
NLA’s actions, the Macedonian army called for a general mobilisation 
on 5 March and launched an offensive against the NLA’s stronghold of 
Tanuševci. While the Macedonian army seized control of the village and 
its surroundings, it was not able to prevent the violence from spread-
ing.37
The crowning achievement of the Albanians was their success in in-
ternationalising the confl ict. In this, they were aided by a panic stricken 
Macedonian establishment. When the leaders of the NLA, at the end of 
March, emphasised that their sole goal for action constituted the protec-
tion of those rights for which they had been fi ghting by peaceful means 
for the past ten years, and not the ambition to create a “Greater Albania”, 
they must have convinced the “wise men of the West” - Javier Solana, 
Lord Robertson, and US Secretary of State Colin Powell - to put pres-
sure on the Macedonian government to start negotiations with the NLA 
to solve the confl ict.38
2.1.2. A partnership of “honest” brokers?
At the beginning of April 2001, a number of EU representatives visited 
Skopje to prepare the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agree-
ment (SAA) with Macedonia on 9 April in Luxembourg.39 The SAA would 
establish legal obligations for Macedonia to approximate its legislation 
to the acquis communautaire and to cooperate with the other countries 
of the Western Balkans. It involved the perspective of the establishment 
of a free trade area between the European Community and the country, 
provisions on cooperation in a wide range of fi elds, including justice and 
of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia within the European Union, soon through 
the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement.”
36 As reported in “Macedonia ‘on brink of abyss’” BBC News (7 March 2001).
37 The confl ict spread out and in the ensuing months ethnic Albanian militants successfully 
“liberated” other villages in Northern Macedonia, including, in June, Ara ivono, from where 
they threatened to launch mortar attacks on the outskirts of Skopje and on the interna-
tional airport.
38 See R Detrez, Macedonië: land in de wachtkamer (Houtekiet, Antwerp 2002) 230-231; and 
‘The Position of the EU and NATO On the Current Situation in the Republic of Macedonia’ 
<http://www.macedonia.org/crisis/story3.html>.
39 Negotiations were closed on 24 November 2000 and the SAA was initialled at the same 
date, during the Zagreb Summit. See COM (2001) 90 fi nal, Brussels, 19 February 2001. For 
an analysis of the SAA, see S Blockmans, ‘Western Balkans’ in S Blockmans and A Łazowski 
(eds), The European Union and Its Neighbours: A Legal Appraisal of the EU’s Policies of Stabi-
lisation, Partnership and Integration (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague 2006) 315-355.
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home affairs, and the provision of fi nancial assistance to help Macedonia 
achieve the objectives of the Agreement. Macedonia was the fi rst and 
at the same time the least prepared country which was offered such an 
agreement. It was meant to repair the shattered confi dence of Macedonia 
in the European Union and to make the government more susceptible to 
Western diplomatic initiatives. Javier Solana, who had been “invited” by 
the European Council at its Stockholm summit of 23 and 24 March “to 
follow the situation in the region, to stay in close touch with the leaders 
and in consultation with the Commission and to make recommendations 
to the Council,”40 used the prospect of the pending signature and ratifi -
cation of the SAA as a strong lever to persuade the Macedonian govern-
ment to engage in negotiations to reform the Constitution and establish 
equal rights for both communities.41 The Albanians found comfort in this 
approach because they expected that Macedonia would never accede to 
the EU if the Albanian question was not resolved according to “European 
standards.” When the Macedonian government realised that negotiations 
on a political agreement with the Albanian militants had become una-
voidable, it decided to build a government of national unity by expanding 
the existing government with moderate Albanian politicians. In this way, 
the coalition would share the responsibility for the amendments to the 
Constitution and other laws with the two biggest ethnic Albanian parties, 
and it would be able to fi nd the necessary two-thirds majority needed to 
push the reforms through parliament.
While the fi ghting on the ground and talks on forming a grand coali-
tion dragged on, Western diplomats tried to hammer out a politically ac-
ceptable implementation plan for the future accord. At the end of June, 
Robert Badinter,42 François Léotard - the freshly appointed EU Special 
Representative in Macedonia,43 and US Special Envoy James Pardew 
were sent to Skopje to mediate in the negotiations on a ceasefi re and a 
political agreement between the parties to the confl ict.44 The ceasefi re 
agreement of 5 July was breached by Albanian extremists. This caused 
the negotiations to stall. As a reaction, the EU adopted punitive sanctions 
40 See EU Bull 3-2001, point I.36.66.
41 In line with the European Parliament’s Resolution of 5 April 2001. See EU Bull 4-2001, 
point 1.6.1.
42 Former President of the French Constitutional Court and President of the so-called “Bad-
inter Arbitration Commission” which opined on the legal consequences of the dissolution 
of the SFRY. From November 1991 until July 1992, the Commission issued ten opinions, 
one interlocutory decision, and one comment concerning Croatia’s constitutional law on 
minorities. All texts are published in 31 ILM (1992) 1494 following. See also S Terrett, The 
Dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Badinter Arbitration Commission: A Contextual study of 
Peace-making Efforts in the Post-Cold War World (Ashgate, Aldershot 2000).
43 Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2001/492,[2001] OJ L 180/1.
44 In the meantime, an agreement on a broad coalition government had been struck. See 
EU Bull 5-2001, point 1.6.12.
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against the ethnic extremists.45 On 25 July, NATO’s Special Envoy Peter 
Feith secured a limited ceasefi re agreement in and around Tetovo. The 
following day, Solana and Robertson, accompanied by the Chairman-in-
Offi ce of the OSCE, Mircea Geoana, travelled to Skopje to blow new life 
into the negotiations.46 On 28 July, the negotiators decided to move the 
talks to Villa Biljana, on the idyllic shores of Lake Ohrid. Despite some 
heavy fi ghting in the fi rst two weeks of August, a political deal was struck 
at Ohrid on 8 August.
It can be said that the new institutional framework for the CFSP 
and the ESDP allowed EU action in Macedonia to produce a more posi-
tive outcome than was the case in previous Balkan crises. Nonetheless, 
in terms of confl ict prevention stricto sensu, the Union failed to identify, 
let alone address, some of the early signs which pointed to the possi-
bility that a crisis might emerge in the FYROM, long before it actually 
did in January 2001.47 The Albanian armed insurgency amounted to low 
intensity warfare, but nevertheless created a humanitarian catastrophe 
when one considers the numbers of ethnic Albanian refugees which fl ed 
into Kosovo (approx. 65,000) and internally displaced persons in Mac-
edonia (approx. 35,000).48 To a large extent, the Union’s success in pre-
venting the further escalation of violence into a full-blown civil war and 
in suppressing the confl ict is thanks to its “preventive” diplomacy and 
the leading role played by Javier Solana. The SG/HR travelled to Skopje 
on countless occasions, sometimes accompanied by Chris Patten. Sup-
ported on the ground by François Léotard, the EU’s resident envoy, and 
José Pinto Teixeira, Head of the Commission Delegation, the SG/HR put 
considerable pressure on both the Macedonian and the Albanian sides to 
engage in dialogue.49 The looming signature of the SAA between the EU 
and the FYROM was certainly the strongest incentive at Solana’s disposal 
to force the two parties in the confl ict to arrive at an agreement by po-
litical means. To this end, the Commission’s brand-new Rapid Reaction 
Mechanism (RRM) was also utilised.50
45 Council Common Position concerning a visa ban against extremists in the Former Yugo-
slav Republic of Macedonia (CFSP) 2001/542 [2001] OJ L 194.
46 See Presidency statement on behalf of the European Union on the situation in the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia of 26 July 2001, in EU Bull 7/8-2001, point 1.6.10.
47 See eg S Clément, Confl ict Prevention in the Balkans: Case Studies of Kosovo and the FYR 
of Macedonia (ISS, Paris1997) 13-16 and 24-27. Clément draws the same conclusion about 
the limited preventive measures adopted by the international community, “in particular the 
European Union”, in the case of Kosovo; at 21-23. See also S Clément, ‘Former Yugoslav 
Macedonia, the Regional Setting and European Security: Towards Balkan Stability?’ in J. 
Pettifer (ed), The New Macedonian Question (Palgrave, Basingstoke 2001) 285-302.
48 UNHCR estimates reported in IWPR 261, 4 July 2001.
49 See N Whyte, N Arbatova and D Allin, ‘The Macedonian Crisis and Balkan Security’, 
(2001) ESF Working Papers.
50 Council Regulation (EC) 381/2001 creating a rapid-reaction mechanism, [2001] OJ L 
57/5. The RRM allows the Commission to dispatch Community funds rapidly in case of an 
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But the Union could not have managed to broker the peace deal at 
Ohrid without the support of NATO and, to a lesser extent, the US and 
OSCE. NATO’s involvement was logical if one considers that KFOR’s sup-
ply routes and logistical bases were in Macedonia. From a more geopoliti-
cal perspective, NATO’s southern fl ank - comprising the ever adversarial 
Turkey and Greece - could be destabilised by an inter-religious confl ict in 
the Balkans. Add to this the destabilising and radicalising impact upon 
the delicate fabric of Kosovo of the throngs of ethnic Albanian refugees 
from Macedonia, and Lord Robertson’s active engagement becomes more 
understandable, as does his relentless pressure on local politicians to 
deliver a peace agreement.
2.1.3. Ohrid Framework Agreement (2001)
The Ohrid Framework Agreement was signed at a ceremony at the 
residence of President Trajkovski in Skopje on 13 August 2001.51 With 
their presence, Solana, Robertson, Geoana, Pardew, and Léotard em-
phasised the importance which the international community attached to 
the Agreement. The text of the Ohrid Framework Agreement contained 
a series of commitments - in the form of basic principles and legisla-
tive modifi cations, which parliament had to apply through constitutional 
amendments and implementing laws. Among the basic principles, the 
parties to the Agreement rejected the use of violence in pursuit of political 
aims, recognised Macedonia’s sovereignty, its territorial integrity, and the 
multi-ethnic character of its society, and underlined the development of 
local self-government to encourage the participation of citizens in demo-
cratic life and promote respect for the identity of communities. The par-
ties agreed to a complete cessation of hostilities, after which the ethnic 
Albanian armed groups would be completely disarmed and disbanded 
with the assistance of NATO. The rest of the Agreement was devoted to 
the more concrete revision of legislation on, inter alia, local self-govern-
ment,52 the revision of municipal boundaries one year after a new census 
emergency. It can be used both to conduct once-off actions arising out of a crisis situation, 
and to “kick-start” projects or programmes which will require longer-term follow-up through 
other assistance instruments. The RRM funds measures aimed at restoring the conditions 
of stability under which the main Community cooperation programmes can achieve their 
objectives. These can include measures to restore the rule of law, promote democracy and 
human rights, peace-building and mediation initiatives, the demobilisation and reintegra-
tion of combatants, the reconstruction of infrastructure and the strategic planning of the 
economic, administrative and social rebuilding of countries affected by crisis. The funds 
available through the RRM were €20 million for 2001 and €25 million for 2002. The RRM 
was fi rst used in March 2001 to pay for the reconstruction of houses destroyed or damaged 
by the fi ghting in the areas of Tetovo and Skopska Crna Gora.
51 The Agreement is available at <http://faq.macedonia.org/politics/framework_agreement.pdf>.
52 To reinforce the powers of elected local offi cials and to enlarge their competences in the 
areas of public services, urban and rural planning, environmental protection, local eco-
nomic development, culture, local fi nances, education, social welfare, and health care.
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(to be held by the end of 2001), and the employment in public adminis-
tration.53
Special Parliamentary Procedures were agreed to for the amendment 
of the Constitution and the Law on Local Self-Government: a qualifi ed 
majority of two-thirds of votes, “within which there must be a majority of 
the votes of representatives claiming to belong to the communities not in 
the majority in the population of Macedonia.”54 The same clause applied 
to the majority of votes required for the revision of laws affecting culture, 
the use of language, education, personal documentation, the use of sym-
bols, as well as laws on local fi nances, local elections, the city of Skopje, 
and boundaries of municipalities.
With respect to primary and secondary education, instruction would 
be provided in the students’ native languages. State funding would be 
provided for university level education in languages spoken by at least 20 
per cent of the population of Macedonia. It was agreed that Macedonian 
would be the offi cial language of the country. Any other language spoken 
by at least 20 per cent of the population was also recognised as an offi cial 
language and said to be used for the communication with the central and 
with and/or within decentralised authorities. In criminal and civil judi-
cial proceedings at any level, an accused person or any party was said to 
have the right to translation at state expense of all proceedings as well 
as documents. Local authorities were given the right to place on front of 
local public buildings, next to the emblem of the “Republic of Macedonia,” 
emblems marking the identity of the community in the majority in the 
municipality.
The Constitutional amendments attached to the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement in Annex A had to be presented to parliament immediately. 
The parties obliged themselves to take all measures to assure the adop-
tion of these amendments within 45 days of signature of the Agreement. 
The legislative modifi cations identifi ed in Annex B were expected to be 
adopted in accordance with the timetables specifi ed therein. Finally, the 
parties invited the international community to convene an international 
donor conference to address in particular macro-fi nancial assistance and 
the fi nancing of the measures to be undertaken for the purpose of imple-
menting the Framework Agreement.
Annex C to the Framework Agreement contained a number of issues 
which concerned the international community. The parties “invited” the 
international community to facilitate, monitor, and assist in the imple-
53 To assure the equitable representation of communities in all central and local public 
bodies, especially the police services, and at all levels of employment within such bodies, 
while respecting the rules concerning competence and integrity that govern public admin-
istration.
54 Ohrid Framework Agreement, section 5.1.
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mentation of the provisions of the Agreement and its Annexes, and “re-
quested” such efforts to be coordinated by the EU in cooperation with the 
newly established Stabilisation and Association Council. The Council of 
Europe and the European Commission were asked to supervise a census 
to be conducted. The OSCE and other international organisations were 
invited to send observers to the parliamentary elections of 2002. Further-
more, the parties pledged to work to ensure the return of refugees and 
internally displaced persons to their homes within the shortest possible 
timeframe and invited in particular UNHCR to assist in these efforts. The 
parties invited the EU, OSCE, and the US to support and assist with the 
implementation of the commitment to ensuring that the police services 
would by 2004 generally refl ect the composition and distribution of the 
population of Macedonia, in particular through the screening and selec-
tion of candidates and their training. In addition, the EU, OSCE, and the 
US were also invited to deploy, as soon as possible, international monitors 
and police advisors in sensitive areas. Finally, the parties invited the inter-
national community to assist in the training of lawyers, judges, and pros-
ecutors from members of communities not in the majority in Macedonia in 
order to be able to increase their representation in the judicial system.
A major fl aw in the Framework Agreement came in the form of the 
special governmental privileges (in respect of education and the use of 
languages): as said, they were only granted to minorities making up “at 
least 20 per cent of the population.”55 Ironically, the Agreement in the 
preamble asserted that it “will promote the peaceful and harmonious de-
velopment of civil society while respecting the ethnic identity and the 
interests of all Macedonian citizens.” With thousands of Macedonian citi-
zens of various ethnic backgrounds who make up less than 20 per cent 
of the population,56 the Ohrid Framework unequivocally discriminated 
against these citizens.57
2.1.4. Sustainability of the diplomatic efforts
While the Ohrid Framework Agreement has been criticised as a con-
tinuation of “the infamous tradition of compacts imposed by a war-weary 
55 Ohrid Framework Agreement, section 6.
56 Macedonian 64.2 per cent, Albanian 25.2 per cent, Turkish 3.9 per cent, Roma 2.7 per 
cent, Serb 1.8 per cent, other 2.2 per cent (2002 census). See CIA World Factbook, available 
at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/mk.html>.
57 See S Gligorov and M Koloski, ‘Decentralization, or Euro-Discrimination?’ 4 November 
2004 <http://www.maknews.com/html/articles/koloski/koloski8.html>.
last accessed 19 March 2006: “Public pressure against fulfi lment of the Framework Agree-
ment surfaced in the form of large public protests against race-based decentralisation. The 
Constitutional requirement for Referendum put democratic power back in the hands of the 
people when over 150,000 signed a petition against the Framework.” 
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West on helpless and hapless small nations” and was doomed to fail,58 
it did, in the medium term,59 bring an end to several months of violence 
between ethnic Albanian groups and the state security forces. In the sec-
ond half of 2001, NATO collected 4,000 pieces of weapons from the NLA 
(Operation Essential Harvest).
The Ohrid Framework Agreement provided for a decentralised sys-
tem of governance, an equitable representation for ethnic Albanians in 
the Macedonian state structures, and the recognition of the Albanian 
language and culture. It is true, however, that additional “carrots and 
sticks” were necessary to persuade the former rivals to adhere to their 
commitments. In October 2001, for example, the Commission adopted 
a decision to fi nance a Confi dence Building Programme for Macedonia, 
including the use of funds of the RRM. This package worth €10.3 million 
was inextricably linked to the full ratifi cation of all the amendments to 
the Macedonian Constitution (16 November 2001), as well as the new Law 
on Local Self-Government (24 January 2002).60 Withholding fi nancial in-
centives by postponing the donor conference to which the international 
community had been “invited” proved another useful tool to clear hurdles 
in the implementation process of the Framework Agreement. At that con-
ference, which was held in Brussels on 12 March 2002, the international 
community pledged €307 million to reform in Macedonia - €50 million 
more than the country had asked for.61 Finally, the threat by the Euro-
pean Union to revise the one-year old SAA was another (doubtful) method 
used by the Union to cajole the Macedonian parliament into adopting the 
necessary laws on the use of languages in April 2002.62
After a series of constitutional amendments and changes to more 
than 70 laws, the adoption of the law on use of fl ags of the communities 
on 15 July 2005 meant that Macedonia completed the legislative agenda 
set out in the Ohrid Framework Agreement.63 Despite the criticism on the 
58 See S Vaknin, ‘Macedonia’s Framework Agreement’ 20 August 2005, http://www.global-
politician.com/articleshow.asp?ID=1106&cid=3&sid=10 last accessed 19 March 2006.
59 In the months following the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, ethnic Albanian 
gangs continued with isolated armed provocations and terrorist attacks, such as setting 
bombs in residential areas and intimidating Slavic Macedonians by destroying their homes 
and preventing their safe returns.
60 European Commission Confl ict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit, Rapid Reaction 
Mechanism End of Programme Report Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, November 
2003 <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/rrm/fyrom.pdf>.
61 Ibid.
62 See R Detrez, Macedonië: land in de wachtkamer (Houtekiet, Antwerp 2002) 257.
63 See SG/HR’s statement to mark the occasion, S259/05, 15 July 2005: “While the com-
pletion of the legislative agenda of the Framework Agreement marks the end of an important 
process, it does not mean that the Ohrid agenda is fulfi lled. Mission accomplished can only 
be declared when rules are respected, realities on ground have changed, and long-term 
reforms such as decentralisation and equitable representation have been fully carried out. 
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Ohrid Framework Agreement, its implementation has spurred a process 
of rapid stabilisation and normalisation of the situation in Macedonia.64 
The country is now defi nitely in much better shape than in 2001. Instead 
of facing a destructive confl ict, it is currently engaged in a constructive 
effort to gain membership of the European Union. It is to be hoped that 
the basis for this rapid transformation process, the principles of multi-
ethnicity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Macedonia, as laid down 
in the Framework Agreement, will stand the test of time.
2.2. The death of the third “Yugoslavia”65 
2.2.1. The need to restructure relations between Serbia and Montenegro
The relations between Belgrade and Podgorica had been deadlocked 
ever since Milo DjukanoviÊ and his Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) 
beat MiloševiÊ’s confederates in Montenegro on a pro-independence tick-
et in the 1997 presidential and the 1998 parliamentary elections.66 Dju-
kanoviÊ’s victory revealed the fundamental fl aw of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, the two-state federation created in April 1992 from the 
remainder of Tito’s Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: the equality 
of the two unequal partners in the federation.67 Between the inaugura-
Further clarifi cation might be needed in the area of use of languages. Tackling these chal-
lenges will form part the future European reform agenda.”
64 From the side of the Council, this process was overseen by a series of EU Special Rep-
resentatives. By Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2001/760 of 29 October 2001[2001] OJ L 
287, Alain Le Roy was appointed as the EUSR in Macedonia to replace François Léotard. 
One year later, Le Roy was replaced by Alexis Brouhns; see Council Joint Action (CFSP) 
2002/832 of 21 October 2002 [2002] OJ L 258/12. Brouhns’ mandate was prolonged and 
widened by Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2002/963 of 10 December 2002 [2002] OJ L 334/7 
and Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2003/870 of 8 December 2003 [2003] OJ L 326/39, inter 
alia to draw clearer lines of command and to give guidance to the fi rst ESDP missions in 
the country (see chapter 3.2 below). Brouhns was replaced by Michael Sahlin; see Council 
Joint Action (CFSP) 2004/565 of 26 July 2004 [2004] OJ L 251/18, who was replaced by 
Erwan Fouéré by way of Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2005/724 of 17 October 2005 [2005] 
OJ L 272/26. Fouéré was also appointed Head of the European Commission’s delegation 
in Skopje.
65 The facts described in this section are primarily based on the Balkan Crisis Reports of the 
London-based Institute for War & Peace Reporting <http://www.iwpr.net>.
66 See F Bieber, ‘Montenegrin Politics Since the Disintegration of Yugoslavia’ in F Bieber 
(ed), Montenegro in Transition: Problems of Identity and Statehood (NOMOS, Baden-Baden 
2003) 11-42.
67 Serbia is 16 times bigger than Montenegro in terms of population and 6 times in terms 
of landmass. See CIA World Fact Book, available at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/
factbook/geos/yi.html>. Anno 2006, the population of Serbia and Montenegro stands at 
roughly 10.5 million with approximately 8 million living in Serbia, 1.9 million in Kosovo, 
and 600,000 in Montenegro. The total landmass is 102,350 sq km: Serbia accounts for 
77,535 sq km, Kosovo for 10,877 sq km, Montenegro for 13,938 sq km.
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tion of DjukanoviÊ as President of Montenegro in January 1998 and the 
fall of MiloševiÊ two and a half years later, tensions between Serbia and 
Montenegro steadily increased. In the light of the escalating confl ict in 
Kosovo and the participation of the Serbian Radical Party in the Serbian 
government in early 1998, the Serbian authorities adopted an increas-
ingly belligerent tone, using the considerable army presence in Montene-
gro to put pressure on the republican authorities.68 Simultaneously, the 
DjukanoviÊ government adopted an increasingly independence-minded 
policy, leading eventually to the outright call for Montenegro’s secession 
from Serbia.69 Montenegro effectively ended most economic ties with Ser-
bia, inter alia by adopting the German Mark in November 1999 as a par-
allel currency - and, as of November 2000, as an exclusive one (before 
switching to the Euro in early 2002).70 In response, Serbia established 
checkpoints at the border between the two republics and started collect-
ing customs - thus, in fact, re-affi rming Montenegro’s independence in all 
but name. The FRY had become a dead letter.
The deadlock in relations between Belgrade and Podgorica became 
an acute political dilemma after MiloševiÊ was removed from the presi-
dential peluche in the wake of the epochal elections in October 2000. In 
the course of just a few months, all major players managed to manoeuvre 
themselves into an untenable position. DjukanoviÊ, expecting MiloševiÊ 
to win, had boycotted the federal elections. As a consequence, his natu-
ral allies, the reform-oriented and pro-Western Democratic Opposition of 
Serbia (DOS), took over power in Serbia but had to make a coalition at 
the federal level with the reactionary Montenegrin opposition. The reform 
drive and international credibility of the political programme of the late 
Zoran DjindjiÊ, the new Prime Minister of Serbia, fell prey to the stand-off 
over competences between federation and republic. The newly installed 
President Vojislav Koštunica saw his lead in popularity diminish in com-
parison with DjindjiÊ and other younger reformers - a development partly 
due to the powerlessness of his position. The nationalist opposition of 
68 See E Schmitt, ‘Crisis in the Balkans: The Military; NATO Commander Says MiloševiÊ is 
Moving Forces Into Pro-Western Montenegrin Republic’, New York Times (2 July 1999); and 
‘Armed Yugoslav Troops Take over Montenegro’s Main Airport’, New York Times (9 Decem-
ber 1999).
69 See S Erlanger, ‘Montenegrins See Split with Serbia’, New York Times (18 October 
1999).
70 The dispute over Montenegro’s status has been considerably informed by economic con-
siderations. See B Huszka, ‘The Dispute over Montenegrin Independence’, in F. Bieber (ed), 
Montenegro in Transition: Problems of Identity and Statehood (NOMOS, Baden-Baden 2003) 
43-62. The successful introduction of the Euro is by no means an indication of economic 
strength or aptitude: Podgorica is not bound by any criteria of economic convergence. The 
currency is more convenient for legal and not-so-legal international dealings than for an ail-
ing local economy. See ICG, ‘Montenegro’s Independence Drive’, 7 December 2005 Europe 
Report No 169.
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former MiloševiÊ parties witnessed the once proud Yugoslavia become 
defunct, with a quasi-independent state in Montenegro and a quasi-pro-
tectorate in Kosovo. In Podgorica, his narrow victory on 22 April 2001 in 
the parliamentary elections and the rising popularity of the Socialist Peo-
ple’s Party of Montenegro (SNP) in the polls determined DjukanoviÊ’s re-
luctance to implement his promise for a referendum on independence.71 
Thus, after the euphoria at the end of 2000 of fi nally having democratic 
negotiation partners and two constructive and apparently compatible 
platforms,72 the actual talks between Belgrade and Podgorica soon stalled 
in a “consent not to consent.” As all players came to realise that they had 
manoeuvred themselves into a “lose-lose” situation, the perspective of 
closer relations with the EU provided economic incentives as well as a 
welcome excuse to accept mediation from the EU’s High Representative 
for the CFSP. 
2.2.2. The EU as an honest broker?
From December 2001 onwards, when Javier Solana took on the “mis-
sion impossible” to fi nd middle ground between Belgrade and Podgorica 
and prevent a spring referendum on the independence of Montenegro, 
criticism grew louder and louder. No doubt, Solana’s role went far beyond 
merely offering “good offi ces.”73 As participants to the negotiations have 
indicated, Solana often dangled the carrot of opening negotiations on a 
prospective Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the FRY 
and the EU, with its immediate economic advantages and its alluring 
promise of future EU membership.74 But the SG/HR was also reported 
71 See M TadiÊ, ‘Montenegrin Independence on Hold’ (2001) 240 IWPR Balkan Crisis Re-
port.
72 The Montenegrin negotiation position was brought to paper by DjukanoviÊ on 29 Decem-
ber 2000. The joint reply by federal President Koštunica and Serbian Prime Minister DjindjiÊ 
was presented on 10 January 2001. The full texts of both positions are reproduced in CEPS 
Europa South-East Monitor, Issue 19, January 2001. Typically, whereas the DjukanoviÊ 
platform dwelled on the injustices of past Montenegro-Serbia relations and Montenegro’s 
“inalienable right to self-determination,” the preamble of the response by Koštunica and 
DjindjiÊ highlighted the merits of federal arrangements, the historic and cultural ties as well 
as joint economic interests.
73 In its original meaning, good offi ces aim at the initiation or resumption of negotiations 
only, with no active participation of the third party. In a mediatory process, on the other 
hand, the third party tries to bring the confl icting parties to an agreement for peaceful set-
tlement by actively participating in the process of negotiations. In practice, however, the 
borderline between the two methods is often blurred. Nowadays, the term “good offi ces” 
is generally accepted to mean the supply of mediation services by persons of high moral 
standing and acknowledged impartiality to fi nd an amicable settlement of a dispute between 
states.
74 See G Barrett, ‘EU and Serbia and Montenegro’ in D Lopandi  and V Baji  (eds), Serbia 
and Montenegro on the Road to the European Union - Two Years Later (European Movement 
in Serbia, Belgrade 2003) 37-45.
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to have threatened Montenegro with cutting off at least half of the EU’s 
fi nancial aid if Podgorica pursued its plans to stage a referendum on 
independence.75 On 14 February 2002, the Brussels-based Centre for 
European Policy Studies (CEPS) and International Crisis Group (ICG) 
published an open letter to the SG/HR concerning Montenegro.76 One 
part of the think tanks’ critique concerned Solana’s methods of apply-
ing extreme pressure to just one side in order to “bulldozer” Podgorica 
towards the EU’s preferred solution. In their view, the European Union 
used its hegemony as a regional economic power to force a state union 
on “unwilling partners.”77 The other half of the critique concerned the dic-
tated outcome of the negotiations: “a democratic Montenegro in a demo-
cratic (FR)Yugoslavia.”78 This solution was considered “economically and 
politically unwise.”79 Solana’s attempts to keep Serbia and Montenegro 
together were more often than not understood as blunt efforts to save the 
status quo, with some minor, cosmetic modifi cations. Consequently, the 
EU would end up polarising the parties and supporting the line of the 
reactionary SNP nationalists in Montenegro and the parties of the former 
Miloševi  coalition in Serbia. 
Once both Koštunica and DjindjiÊ had expressed their willingness 
to consider a new form of federation with Montenegro (albeit not at all 
cost), Solana indeed ended up siding with the reactionary forces on the 
federal level and in Montenegro, cajoling the pro-independence parties 
into making major concessions to their programme.80 Publicly, the EU 
failed to distance its stabilisation objective from the die-hard conserva-
tism of the local pro-Yugoslav forces. Nevertheless, the fi nal agreement, 
which constituted a compromise between the two original position pa-
pers, ultimately favoured the reformers rather than the reactionaries. 
The “creation” of the new state union of “Serbia and Montenegro” and a 
temporary freezing of the status issue allowed pro-Western politicians in 
both republics to pursue their reform agendas with more zeal.
2.2.3. Belgrade Agreement (2002)
A document called “Proceeding Points for the Restructuring of Rela-
tions Between Serbia and Montenegro” - commonly known as the Bel-
75 See M TadiÊ, ‘Montenegro: DjukanoviÊ Cornered over Independence’ (2002) 319 IWPR 
Balkan Crisis Report.
76 The open letter is reproduced in CEPS Europa South-East Monitor, Issue 31, January/
February 2002. 
77 Ibid.
78 See Council Conclusions throughout 2001, published in EU Bull 2001.
79 CEPS Europa South-East Monitor, Issue 31, January/February 2002. 
80 See M Wisse Smit, ‘Comment: Squabbling Yugoslav Republics Set for Divorce’ (2002) 322 
IWPR Balkan Crisis Report.
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grade Agreement, after the place were it was signed on 14 March 2002 
- was the outcome of the trilateral negotiations among the governments 
of Serbia, Montenegro, and the Federal Republic Yugoslavia with the SG/
HR as mediator and “witness” to the agreement.81 In the most princi-
pal set of issues, international status and representation, the Belgrade 
Agreement contains only one short reference to “elements of Serbian and 
Montenegrin statehood, stemming from the present-day factual situation 
and the historic rights of the two member states.” The Agreement largely 
follows the Serb position with a veto on unilateral secession. Montenegro 
was not granted its desired international legal personality, but in return, 
Serbia (and the European Union) accepted the option of a referendum on 
independence three years after the adoption of the Constitutional Char-
ter which was to implement the Agreement. To protect Montenegro’s in-
terests from being swamped by Serb domination of the joint institutions 
and international representative positions, specifi c safeguards were built 
in for proportional representation by rotation.
As far as the more tangible issues of the relations between the fed-
eration and the composite republics and the division of competences are 
concerned, the Belgrade Agreement is largely uninformative. The range of 
joint competences and ministries - defence, foreign affairs, internal and 
international economic relations as well as human and minority rights 
(including cooperation with the ICTY) - copied the Montenegrin proposal, 
with the exception of the common market and the convertible currency 
(Euro). As the composite republics were allowed to keep their separate 
economies, currencies, and customs services, the actual competences 
of the federation in internal and international economic relations were 
not clearly formulated. In the sphere of defence, conscripts would not be 
forced to serve outside their own republic against their will. There would 
be only one federal army - a lesson from Bosnia.
In terms of state institutions and decision-making, the Belgrade 
Agreement followed the more pragmatic Serbian approach based on op-
erability rather than a strict interpretation of equality. The impracticable 
mode of the two republican ministers of defence and foreign affairs taking 
turns at the respective nominal position on the federal level was replaced 
by an “exchange of roles” by these two federal ministers and their respec-
tive deputies (from the other republic). In line with the limited compe-
81 The Proceeding Points for a Restructuring of Relations between Serbia and Montenegro 
have been reproduced in CEPS Europa South-East Monitor, Issue 31, January/February 
2002. For further analyses and commentaries, see eg N Bentzen, Fata Solana. Die Staats-
union Serbien-Montenegro - eine Spiegelung zwischen ”Balkan” und EU? (Interdisziplinäre 
Balkanstudien - IDM Vienna University, Vienna 2004) <http://homepage.univie.ac.at/Ve-
dran.Dzihic/balkan_bentzen.pdf>; and W van Meurs, ‘The Belgrade Agreement: Robust Me-
diation Between Serbia and Montenegro’ in F Bieber (ed), Montenegro in Transition: Problems 
of Identity and Statehood (NOMOS, Baden-Baden 2003) 63-79.
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tences of the federal government the Belgrade Agreement did not foresee 
a prime minister. The supervision of the ministerial council would be in 
the hands of the president. The unicameral parliament elected by all citi-
zens of the federation pointed in the same direction, ignoring demands 
for a parallel system of republican parity next to individual democratic 
rights.
In short, apart from the clear decision to rename the FRY, most of 
the contentious issues had been left open, awaiting a constructive ne-
gotiation process to fi ll in the gaps. Thus, the Belgrade Agreement was 
essentially a declaration of intent rather than a constitutional blueprint. 
The modalities for achievement of the goals set out in the Agreement were 
to be elaborated in parallel with the Constitutional Charter. The substan-
tiation of the Agreement by a mixed commission from the two republican 
parliaments and the federal parliament proved no easy task.82 The com-
mission presented a Constitutional Charter in June 2002. Thereafter, 
newly elected republican parliaments and eventually a federal parliament 
elected by the entire constituency of “Serbia and Montenegro” passed 
democratic judgment on the new federation. The Constitutional Charter 
was adopted and proclaimed on 4 February 2003 by the Parliament of 
Serbia and Montenegro.83
2.2.4. Sustainability of the EU’s diplomatic efforts in view of the ongoing 
drive for an independent Montenegro
The Belgrade Agreement left a number of questions unanswered. 
An obvious question concerned the state’s ambiguous character between 
federation and confederation. Effectively, “Serbia and Montenegro” was a 
continuation of the 1992 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.84 At the same 
time, however, the fact that the Constitutional Charter had to be passed 
by the parliaments of the composite republics after elections indicated an 
institutional break with the past. Many in Serbia, nostalgic for the days of 
Tito, regretted the loss of the name “Yugoslavia” and the ideal of a multi-
ethnic state it once implied. To others in the region, “Yugoslavia” stood 
only for Serb ethno-nationalism and ethnic cleansing. After the extradi-
82 For an elaboration on the open questions, hidden caveats and diffi cult negotiation proc-
ess, see W van Meurs, ‘The Belgrade Agreement: Robust Mediation Between Serbia and 
Montenegro’ in F Bieber (ed), Montenegro in Transition: Problems of Identity and Statehood 
(NOMOS, Baden-Baden 2003) 73-78; and G Noutcheva, ‘Negotiating a Viable State Union of 
Serbia and Montenegro’ (2002) CEPS Commentary. 
83 See Offi cial Gazette of Serbia and Montenegro No 1 of 4 February 2003 <http://www.
osce.org/documents/fry/2003/02/133_en.pdf>. 
For the EU’s reaction, see Council Conclusions Press Release 6604/03 (Presse 52) 24 Feb-
ruary 2003
84 Recognised by not only by the EU, but also the UN. SaM took the seat of the FRY in the 
GA.
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tion of Miloševi , dropping the name “Yugoslavia” was a second reassur-
ing symbol, a farewell to the era of ethnic confl ict and human tragedy. Of 
course, the argument that Yugoslavia in its three forms - the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1918-1945), the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (1945-1992), and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1992-
2002) - was a historic error or that the FRY was an anti-European and 
anti-democratic state, reintroduced the ideal of nation-states through the 
backdoor.
Another defi cit of the Belgrade Agreement concerned the economic 
integration of the two composite republics: each member of the state 
union retained its own economic, fi nancial and customs systems, and 
Montenegro the Euro. Both the EU mediators and the negotiating parties 
clearly gave priority to easing tensions over the status question, hoping 
that new economic momentum spurred by the Stabilisation and Associa-
tion Process would make up for the evident disadvantages of economic 
separation.85
The principal question related to the impact of the Belgrade Agree-
ment on stability in the region. One of the reasons why the EU had strongly 
objected to the idea of Montenegrin independence ever since DjukanoviÊ 
took offi ce, although the Badinter Commission had confi rmed Montene-
gro’s right to self-determination,86 was concern that allowing a referen-
dum on independence would create further tensions within a very divided 
society.87 The chief reason, however, was the EU’s worry for a precedent 
followed by yet another round of state fragmentation in a region tradi-
tionally suffering from too many projects of state- and nation-building. 
The EU was afraid that unravelling the Yugoslav federation would open 
the way to independence for unstable Kosovo, potentially even Republika 
Srpska. Kosovo’s unresolved status was the main obstacle for Montene-
gro’s independence, although political leaders in Podgorica and Priština 
never tired of denying any such nexus.88
What the Belgrade Agreement achieved was gaining time rather than 
playing for time. It erased the illusion of a viable FRY and it stabilised 
relations between the two republics. The Agreement, as given hands and 
85 See D ReljiÊ, ‘Serbien und Montenegro einigen sich über zukünftige staatliche Gemein-
schaft’ (2002) SWP-Brennpunkte. On the Stabilisation and Association Process, see S Block-
mans (n 39).
86 See 31 ILM (1992), 1494 following.
87 The high cost of integrating an independent Montenegro into the EU has been mentioned 
as another reason for the Union’s opposition. See M Wisse Smit, ‘Comment: Squabbling 
Yugoslav Republics Set for Divorce’ (2002) 322 IWPR Balkan Crisis Report.
88 Recent history has shown that, indeed, Kosovar politicians do not abandon their aspira-
tions for independence, no matter what kind of constitutional acrobatics the Montenegrins 
perform.
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feet by the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro, prescribed a 
three-year cooling-off period before any of the composite republics could 
hold a referendum on independence.89 Even if the new state union were 
only a transitional solution, it ended the constitutional confusion and 
political deadlock, without impeding the progress of either towards Euro-
pean integration.90 Most importantly, it gave the international community 
time to fi nd a way to tackle the fi nal status question for Kosovo. The price 
which the EU was willing to pay for that was the acceptance of secession 
by Montenegro, counter to international rules on the inviolability of bor-
ders, as long as the vote would be “legitimate”, i.e. represent a 50 per cent 
threshold for participation and 55 per cent for approval for any result.91
In the end, the Belgrade Agreement was a mere stopgap before Mon-
tenegro held its independence referendum on 21 May 2006. In a narrow 
victory, 55.5 per cent of Montenegro’s voters said they wanted independ-
ence and thereby effectively made an end to the state union with Serbia. 
The EU, OSCE and neighbouring countries congratulated Montenegro 
on the free and fair manner in which the referendum was conducted and 
expressed their satisfaction with the high turnout (86.49 per cent).92 In a 
special session on 3 June, and pursuant to Article 60 of the Constitution-
al Charter, the parliament in Podgorica passed a declaration on the in-
dependence of the Republic of Montenegro. On 5 June, the parliament in 
Belgrade declared the Republic of Serbia the legal successor to the state 
union and gave all state institutions 45 days to complete the separation. 
Under the terms of the Constitutional Charter, Serbia inherited member-
ship of the UN and other international organisations, leaving Montenegro 
to apply in its own right. On 12 June, the Council of the EU recognised 
that the parliamentary acts were taken in conformity with the arrange-
ments and the procedures foreseen in the 2002 Belgrade Agreement and 
with Article 60 of the Constitutional Charter. Hence, the Council gave the 
Member States the go-ahead for the recognition of the two new Balkan 
89 Incidentally, it gave the pro-independence movement in Montenegro ample time to pre-
pare for a referendum.
90 In the period from the signing of the Belgrade Agreement to the adoption of the so-called 
“twin-track approach” in November 2004, the effectiveness of the Union’s approach towards 
SaM did, however, suffer from incoherence and inconsistencies between the demands from 
the SG/HR and the Council on the one hand, and the European Commission on the other. 
See N Tocci, ‘EU Intervention in Ethno-political Confl icts: the cases of Cyprus and Serbia-
Montenegro’ (2004) 9 EFA Review 551-573; and R Keane, ‘The Case of the Solana Process 
in Serbia and Montenegro: Coherence in EU Foreign Policy’,(2004) 11 International Peace-
keeping 1-17.
91 See Council Conclusions Press Release 6344/06 (Presse 46) 27 February 2006.
92 Croatia is particularly pleased, as it should lead to the rapid resolution of the long-stand-
ing dispute over the Prevlaka peninsula, occupied by the “Yugoslav” army in 1991 and 
which Belgrade has refused to return despite the urging of the Montenegrin government. 
Croatia formally recognised Montenegro on 12 June.
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states. It is expected that it will soon also approve the Commission’s new 
mandates to continue the Stabilisation and Association Process sepa-
rately with Montenegro and Serbia.
Fifteen years since the break-up of Yugoslavia, Montenegro is both 
lucky and unfortunate. It is lucky because it has achieved independence 
while avoiding war; it has not seen inter-ethnic relations poisoned by 
ethno-nationalist mobilisation as elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia.93 
It is unfortunate because its economic and social situation leaves it in 
a precarious position. Despite a series of political, administrative and 
economic reforms, Montenegro still is among the world’s best in terms of 
international assistance per capita.94 It will take years before Montenegro 
will be in the position to join the EU. Serbia, which fi nds itself in a simi-
lar unenviable position economically, has the additional political prob-
lem of the breakaway province Kosovo. Serbia is currently conducting 
face-to-face negotiations with the Kosovo Albanians on fi nding a peaceful 
solution for the status of Kosovo. It is to the EU’s role in this negotiating 
process that the paper now turns.
2.3. The EU in Kosovo
2.3.1. Embedded in an international reconstruction effort
The violence in Kosovo which led to the NATO campaign against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia triggered important qualitative changes in 
the European Union’s policy towards South East Europe as a whole. If 
the US and NATO had done the dirty work of defeating Miloševi  militarily, 
the EU offered what the rest of the international community expected it 
to do: to generate economic growth and political stability in the region.95 
By initiating the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, the EU resur-
93 See F Bieber, ‘Preface’ in F Bieber (ed), Montenegro in Transition: Problems of Identity and 
Statehood (NOMOS, Baden-Baden 2003), 7-9.
94 See ICG, ‘Montenegro’s Independence Drive’ (7 December 2005) Europe Report No 169: 
“Accusations of simulated reforms to please Western donors seem plausible. A signifi cant 
part of economic activity - an estimated 40 to 60 per cent - is related to black market, 
mainly car rackets and cigarettes smuggling. The involvement of political parties and state 
administration is a foregone conclusion. The state needs foreign aid for social peace in 
a poverty-ridden country of rising unemployment, frequent electric power cuts and high 
infl ation. Its economic openness (3 per cent tariff average) may be an asset, but tourism 
certainly is not its main industry at the moment.”
95 See Agreement on the principles (peace plan) to move towards a resolution of the Kosovo 
crisis presented to the leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the President 
of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, representing the European Union, and Viktor Chernomyrdin, 
Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation, UN Doc S/1999/649 (3 
June 1999).
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rected the idea of the “hour of Europe.”96 Adopted on 10 June 1999, the 
day that NATO’s air campaign against Serbia came to an end, the Stabil-
ity Pact’s founding documents solemnly declared that “[t]he EU will draw 
the region closer to the perspective of full integration of these countries 
[in South East Europe] into its structures.”97 However, it was very much 
unclear how the Stability Pact squared with integration. It remained, by 
and large, a regional post-confl ict reconstruction strategy funded by the 
international fi nancial institutions, the EU and its Member States.98 In 
terms of its approach, the Stability Pact was not an accession platform. 
Although initiated by the German Presidency of the EU and sanctioned 
by the European Council at its Cologne summit,99 it was placed institu-
tionally under the umbrella of the OSCE. The EU was just one, albeit the 
most important, stakeholder amongst many. In fact, the Stability Pact ex-
emplifi ed a trend for the EU in Kosovo: in July 1999, the Council of Min-
isters fulfi lled the UN Secretary-General’s wish to entrust to the Union 
the task of managing the economy pillar within the UN’s administration 
in Kosovo,100 thus sharing responsibility for the reconstruction of Kosovo 
with a vast range of international actors.
On the same day as the Stability Pact was launched, the United Na-
tions Security Council passed Resolution 1244 (1999), authorising the 
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to be-
gin a long process of building peace, democracy, stability, and self-gov-
ernment, designed to determine Kosovo’s future status.101 By deciding 
that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis would have to take account 
of the Rambouillet Accords102 and would have to be based on the general 
principles developed by the G-8,103 as further elaborated in the principles 
96 Declaration of Jacques Poos, Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister, to the international press, 
29 June 1991.
97 For the fi nal text of the Stability Pact of 10 June 1999, see <http://www.stabilitypact.
org>. The quote is to be found on page 20 of the text. For more on the Stability Pact, see D 
Phinnemore and P Siani-Davies, ‘Beyond Intervention? The Balkans, the Stability Pact and 
the European Union’ in P Siani-Davies (ed), International Intervention in the Balkans Since 
1995 (Routledge, London 2003) 172-193.
98 See D Bechev, ‘Between Enlargement and CFSP: the EU and the Western Balkans’ (paper 
presented at the LSE European Foreign Policy conference, 2-3 June 2004).
99 EU Bull 6-1999, point I.26.71.
100 Council Joint Action (CFSP) 1999/522 concerning the installation of the structures of 
the UNMIK of 29 July 1999 [1999] OJ L 201/1.
101 (10 June 1999) S/RES/1244.
102 Rambouillet Accords: Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, UN 
Doc S/1999/648 (7 June 1999). The Accords were concluded under the auspices of the 
members of the Contact Group and the EU.
103 See Statement by the Chairman on the conclusion of the meeting of the G-8 Foreign 
Ministers held at the Petersberg Centre reproduced in Annex 1 to UNSC Res 1244 (on 6 
May 1999).
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and other required elements in Annex 2 to the Resolution, the Security 
Council endorsed what later became known as the so-called “standards 
before status” policy. In essence, Kosovo was expected to make progress 
on the eight standards to be achieved by the Provisional Institutions of 
Self-Government (PISG) before its fi nal status could be addressed. Those 
standards concerned: functioning democratic institutions; rule of law; 
freedom of movement; returns and reintegration; economy; property 
rights; dialogue with Belgrade; and the Kosovo Protection Corps.104 The 
implementation of the “standards before status” policy was the core po-
litical project of UNMIK and was given new momentum by the adoption of 
the Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan (KSIP) of 31 March 2004.105
In the fi rst-ever operation of its kind, the UN brought together four 
so-called “pillars” under overall UNMIK leadership:106 police and justice 
(Pillar I) and civil administration (Pillar II) under the direct responsibility 
of the UN;107 democratisation and institution-building (Pillar III) under 
the responsibility of the OSCE; and economic reconstruction, recovery, 
and development (Pillar IV) under the responsibility of the European Un-
ion.108 The work of the EU in Pillar IV has been geared towards modern-
ising the economic framework of Kosovo, with a view to developing the 
104 The “Standards for Kosovo” were agreed between the PISG and UNMIK and subsequently 
launched by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Harry Holkeri and 
Kosovo’s Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi on 10 December 2003. See Press release UNMIK/
PR/1078 of that date. The “Standards” were endorsed by the Security Council on 12 De-
cember 2003. See Presidential Statement S/PRST/2003/26.
105 The KSIP is available at <http://www.unmikonline.org/standards>. The document de-
scribes the concrete actions which must be taken in order to meet the “Standards”. It 
clearly defi nes who is responsible for each of the actions and the timeframe in which they 
should be performed. In the light of the riots of March 2004 and an extensive review of their 
causes and consequences, the goals and actions which most support “sustainable multi-
ethnicity” were prioritised for the review of mid-2005.
106 UNMIK is headed by the SRSG. Bernard Kouchner (France) served as head of UNMIK 
from July 1999 to January 2001. The second head of the UN Mission was Hans Haekkerup 
(Denmark) who served from February 2001 to December 2001. Michael Steiner (Germany) 
served from January 2002 to July 2003. Harri Holkeri (Finland) served from August 2003 
to June 2004. From 16 August 2004 until the end of June 2006, Søren Jessen-Petersen 
(Denmark) presided over the work of the four integral pillars of UNMIK and facilitates the 
political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status. On 12 June he announced 
his resignation. At the time of writing, his successor was not yet known.
107 Pillar II has since been integrated into the Offi ce of the SRSG.
108 Pillar IV is headed by Joachim Rücker since February 2005. Council Joint Action (CFSP) 
1999/522 was extended by Council Joint Action (CFSP) 1999/864 of 21 December 1999 
[1999] OJ L 328/67 and Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2000/175 of 28 February 2000 [2000] 
OJ L 55/78; Council Regulation (EC) 1080/2000 on support for the United Nations In-
terim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the Offi ce of the High Representative in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (OHR) [2000] OJ L 122/27; Council Regulation (EC) 2098/2003 amending 
Regulation (EC) 1080/2000 on support for the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) and the Offi ce of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (OHR) [2003] 
OJ L 316/1.
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structures and instruments that form the basis of a competitive, effi cient 
market economy.109 That is not to say that “Europe’s” infl uence is only 
felt within the framework of Pillar IV. EU Member States’ presence also 
extends to the other three pillars, e.g. through their participation in the 
work which KFOR and OSCE carry out for UNMIK. 110 In fact, since the 
end of the crisis, the EU and its Member States have devoted the lion’s 
share of resources - military, fi nancial, and human - to repair the dam-
age of war and of decades of under-investment and neglect, to increase 
the capacity of local administration, and foster reforms: since 1999, the 
European Community has devoted over 1.6 billion to Kosovo, money 
which has been channelled via ECHO (in 2003, it was phased out of the 
province as the humanitarian crisis was over),111 the European Agency 
for Reconstruction (managing the bulk of CARDS funds), the funding of 
the operating costs of Pillar IV,112 and the fi nancing of the Kosovo Consol-
idated budget via DG ECFIN’s (the European Commission’s Directorate 
General Economic and Financial Affairs) decision on exceptional fi nan-
cial assistance.113
Despite the fact that UNMIK (incl. the EU) gradually transferred a 
large number of competences to Kosovo’s Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government, and that many of the “Standards” were achieved, poverty 
and unemployment remained widespread.114 Bitterness and resentment 
109 Included among the achievements attributed by the EU to its work in Pillar IV are the 
creation of a modern market economy through the introduction of commercial and econom-
ic legislation conforming to European standards; the launch of the privatisation process 
stimulating economic development and investment; the successful switch to the Euro as 
the single currency; the creation of a working banking system with nine commercial banks 
including over 240 branches; the initiation of free trade agreements and integration of Ko-
sovo into various regional and European economic structures; the transformation of the 
customs service into a modern organisation collecting over 70 per cent of the Kosovo Con-
solidated Budget funds; the introduction of various measures to counter economic crime 
and corruption; and the stabilisation of Kosovo’s fragile power situation. See <http://www.
euinkosovo.org/uk/about/about_pillar.php>.
110 For an overview of the experiences in EU-UN cooperation in Kosovo so far, see M Kar-
nitschnig, ‘The United Nations and the European Union in Kosovo: The Challenges of Joint 
Nation-building’ in J Wouters, F Hoffmeister and T Ruys (eds), The United Nations and the 
European Union: An Ever Stronger Partnership (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague 2006) forth-
coming.
111 See the thematic booklet published by the European Commission, ECHO in the Balkans 
- 12 Years of Humanitarian Action 1991-2003 (ECHO, Brussels 2003).
112 Unlike the fi rst three pillars of UNMIK, the operational expenditure of Pillar IV is al-
most fully fi nanced out of the European Commission’s budget. See Council Regulation (EC) 
2098/2003 amending Regulation (EC) 1080/2000 on support for UNMIK and OHR [2003] 
OJ L 316/1.
113 Data available at the EU Pillar’s website <http://www.euinkosovo.org/uk/about/about_
pillar.php>.
114 In 2004, over half of Kosovo’s 2 million people were living on or below the poverty line. 
The average daily income was 3 and the offi cial unemployment rate 39.7 per cent. There 
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grew over the “corrupt” and “colonial” ways of UNMIK’s international 
staff.115 Local frustrations connected to the ambiguity over the fi nal status 
spilled into organised inter-ethnic violence - as witnessed in March 2004. 
The status quo - i.e. “standards before status” - had become unsustain-
able and forced the international community to develop a fresh approach 
to promoting reforms and development in Kosovo. It was eventually ac-
knowledged that working on the standards in the context of the future 
status was a better strategy than insisting on standards before status. 
Following the Comprehensive Review of the situation in Kosovo by UNSG 
Special Envoy Kai Eide in the summer of 2005, the UN Security Council 
on 24 October 2005 endorsed fi nal status talks.116 This decision had been 
facilitated by the rapprochement between Priština and Belgrade after the 
resignation of Ramush Haradinaj as Kosovo’s Prime Minister on 9 March 
2005 and his surrender to the ICTY to face charges of persecuting Serbs, 
gypsies, and suspected collaborators among the ethnic Albanians.
2.3.2. Final status talks
On 10 November, the UN Security Council endorsed the Secretary 
General’s intention to appoint Martti Ahtisaari, former President of Fin-
land, as his Special Envoy to lead the political process, and established 
the following guiding principles for the process, as agreed to by the Con-
tact Group:
(1.) The settlement of the Kosovo issue should be fully compatible 
with international standards of human rights, democracy and in-
ternational law and contribute to regional security. (2.) The settle-
ment of Kosovo’s Status should conform with democratic values and 
European standards and contribute to realizing the European per-
spective of Kosovo, in particular, Kosovo’s progress in the stabiliza-
tion and association process, as well as the integration of the entire 
region in Euro-Atlantic institutions. (3.) The settlement should en-
sure multi-ethnicity that is sustainable in Kosovo. It should provide 
effective constitutional guarantees and appropriate mechanisms to 
ensure the implementation of human rights for all citizens in Kosovo 
and of the rights of members of all Kosovo communities, including 
the right of refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes 
in safety. (4.) The settlement should provide mechanisms to ensure 
were daily debilitating power cuts. See Statistical Offi ce of Kosovo, ‘Series 1: Kosovo in Fig-
ures 2005’, January 2006 <http://www.ks-gov.net/esk/index_english.htm>. See further 
B Knoll, ‘From Benchmarking to Final status? Kosovo and the Problem of an International 
Administration’s Open-ended Mandate’ (2005) 16 EJIL,637-660.
115 See H Smith, ‘Angry Kosovars call on “colonial” UN occupying force to leave’ The Ob-
server (19 October 2003) and Press release UNMIK/PR/1053, 4 November 2003.
116 See UN Doc S/PRST/2005/51.
238 Steven Blockmans: The Role and Impact of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy...
the participation of all Kosovo communities in government, both on 
the central and on the local level. Effective structures of local self-
government established through the decentralization process should 
facilitate the coexistence of different communities and ensure equi-
table and improved access to public services. (5.) The settlement of 
Kosovo’s status should include specifi c safeguards for the protection 
of the cultural and religious heritage in Kosovo. This should include 
provisions specifying the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church’s 
institutions and sites and other patrimony in Kosovo. (6.) The set-
tlement of Kosovo’s status should strengthen regional security and 
stability. Thus, it will ensure that Kosovo does not return to the pre-
March 1999 situation. Any solution that is unilateral or results from 
the use of force would be unacceptable. There will be no changes 
in the current territory of Kosovo, i.e. no partition of Kosovo and 
no union of Kosovo with any country or part of any country. The 
territorial integrity and internal stability of regional neighbours will 
be fully respected. (7.) The Status settlement will ensure Kosovo’s 
security. It will also ensure that Kosovo does not pose a military or 
security threat to its neighbours. Specifi c provisions on security ar-
rangements will be included. (8.) The settlement of Kosovo’s status 
should promote effective mechanisms to strengthen Kosovo’s ability 
to enforce the rule of law, to fi ght organized crime and terrorism and 
safeguard the multi-ethnic character of the police and the judici-
ary. (9.) The settlement should ensure that Kosovo can develop in 
a sustainable way both economically and politically and that it can 
cooperate effectively with international organizations and interna-
tional fi nancial institutions. (10.) For some time Kosovo will continue 
to need an international civilian and military presence to exercise 
appropriate supervision of compliance of the provisions of the Sta-
tus settlement, to ensure security and, in particular, protection for 
minorities as well as to monitor and support the authorities in the 
continued implementation of standards. 117
It is within these parameters - no partition of Kosovo, no union with 
a neighbouring state and no return to pre-1999 conditions - that the 
UNSG Special Envoy will have to fi nd a compromise agreement between 
Priština and Belgrade. On 7 November, the Council of the EU endorsed 
the appointment of Stefan Lehne as EU representative to support the UN 
Status Envoy in the implementation of his mandate. 118 Ahtisaari started 
the fi nal status talks on 21 November 2005 with a fact-fi nding mission 
to both capitals. What he found were two - at fi rst sight - irreconcilable 
positions. The approximately 1.5 million ethnic Albanians in Kosovo en-
117 See UN Doc S/2005/709.
118 See Council Conclusions Press Release 13622/05 (Presse 274) 7 November 2005. 
239CYELP 2 [2006], pp. 209-263
visage only one outcome: an independent Kosovo. Bajram Kosumi, then 
Prime Minister, was reported as having said: “A small country like Kosovo 
would feel insecure if it didn’t have a UN seat.”119 For Belgrade, however, 
independence is anathema. The Serbs, who entered the fi nal status ne-
gotiations with the puzzling slogan “more than autonomy, less than inde-
pendence,” are ready to concede de facto self-government as long as they 
retain sovereignty de jure.120 With the no-compromise Radical Party riding 
high in polls, Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica121 has little negotiating 
space. Kosovo is still a taboo subject. It remains historic Serb territory 
which no politician can give away. Boris TadiÊ, the President of Serbia 
and Montenegro, was reported as having said: “For Serbia it’s unaccept-
able to see Kosovo with a seat in the UN.”122 Complicating the Kosovo 
question is the split-up with Montenegro. While Serbs believe they have 
not “lost” Montenegro in the sense that they face “losing” Kosovo to the 
ethnic Albanians, the break-away Montenegro has scarred the Serbian 
soul and reduced the room for compromise over Kosovo even more.
The Contact Group has so far avoided taking sides, but the US and 
the UK are increasingly leaning towards independence for Kosovo.123 
France and other EU Member States are more cautious, concerned that 
early discussion of independence could take the pressure off Priština to 
negotiate and risk a Serb walk-out of the negotiations.124 The Contact 
Group agrees that minority rights must be guaranteed, peace-keeping 
troops must stay, and an international civilian mission - probably run by 
the European Union - be put in place.125 Russia and China, which had 
previously worried that an independent Kosovo would set a precedent for 
their claimed territories of Chechnya, Tibet, and Taiwan, were reported 
as having told the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that they would 
not block the independence of Kosovo, because they consider the situa-
tion of Kosovo “unique.”126 In the UN Security Council, Russia and China 
119 See S Wagstyl, ‘Why Kosovo might hold the key to the Balkans’ future’ Financial Times 
(19 February 2006).
120 Under his formula, Kosovo would largely manage its own affairs - have its own executive, 
legislative, and judicial authorities - but remain nominally a part of Serbia and forgo dip-
lomatic representation abroad - a single minister of foreign affairs, one minister of defence, 
and one single seat in the United Nations. The 100,000 Kosovo Serbs would have to benefi t 
from a high level of minority rights protection.
121 Koštunica became Prime Minister in spring 2004.
122 See S Wagstyl, ‘Why Kosovo might hold the key to the Balkans’ future’ Financial Times 
(19 February 2006).
123 See ‘Kosovo’s future’, SEEUROPE.NET, 15 February 2006.
124 Ibid.
125 See chapter 2.3.4 below.
126 See G Dinmore and D Dombey, ‘Russia and China “pledge not to block new Kosovo”’ 
Financial Times (14 March 2006).
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would probably abstain from voting on a proposed resolution that would 
grant independence to Kosovo.
Instead of tackling the status question head-on, Ahtisaari opted for 
a bottom-up approach. On 20-21 February 2006, the fi rst round of direct 
negotiations between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians took place in Vienna. 
Middle-ranking offi cials met under the auspices of deputy UNSG Special 
Envoy Albert Rohan (Austria) to discuss rival schemes for the devolution 
of powers from Kosovo’s central authorities to the municipalities. Effec-
tive provisions for the decentralisation of government will be crucial to 
the status settlement, as decentralisation can ensure that minority com-
munities such as the Kosovo Serbs remain a vital part of Kosovo’s future, 
and give impetus to the return of displaced persons who should be able to 
choose where they live in Kosovo. Although no agreement was reached on 
the issue, the negotiations were generally perceived to be largely construc-
tive. After meeting government representatives in Belgrade, Ahtisaari an-
nounced that he would dispatch technical teams to Belgrade and Priština 
to pave the way for continuing negotiations on practical questions. In the 
fi rst half of 2006, fi ve more rounds of talks took place in Vienna.127 Al-
though the talks were inconclusive, they were described by Ahtisaari as 
constructive because they “clarifi ed each side’s stand.”128
While the fi nal status process is expected to last for several months, 
the Contact Group, together with the EU High Representative, the EU 
Presidency, the European Commissioner for Enlargement, NATO’s Sec-
retary-General, the UN Special Status Envoy and the SRSG, expressed 
the belief that all possible efforts should be made to achieve a negotiated 
settlement in the course of 2006.129 The stakes are high. If the UN Special 
Envoy does not get Kosovo right, it could become perpetually underdevel-
oped and prone to unrest, or stay frozen in a decades-long stalemate like 
Cyprus. Equally important - and despite the fact that Kosovo is unusual 
because of the 1999 NATO military intervention that paved the way for 
this current process, the international community’s handling of Kosovo 
will be read around the globe as having broader meaning for what it 
says about minority rights, self-determination, and the way to deal with 
breakaway territories.
127 Prime Minister Bajram Kosumi, who stepped down over accusations by members of his 
coalition of being ineffective, was replaced by former KLA commander Agim Ceku, against 
whom Serbia has issued an arrest warrant. Despite protests from Belgrade, the EU sup-
ported the replacement. See Statement S074/06, ‘Javier Solana, High Representative for 
the CFSP, welcomes confi rmation of new Kosovo government’ 10 March 2006.
128 BETA News Agency, 12 June 2006.
129 Kosovo Contact Group Statement, London, 31 January 2006, <http://ue.eu.int/ueD-
ocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/declarations/88236.pdf>.
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2.3.3. Main legal issues
The question has been raised about what consequences the disso-
lution of the third Yugoslavia would have for the guarantee of its “sov-
ereignty and territorial integrity” in Resolution 1244, all the more so as 
this Resolution referred to Kosovo as part of the FRY, not of Serbia. The 
Belgrade Agreement of 2002 includes an explicit precaution for a pos-
sible disintegration after three years: “If Montenegro withdraws from the 
state union, international documents related to the FRY, the UN Security 
Council Resolution 1244 in particular, shall relate to and fully apply on 
Serbia as its successor.”130 Thus, this weaving fault in Resolution 1244 
was repaired.131 The suggestion that this provision violates the Resolution 
and re-introduces Serb sovereignty over Kosovo seems far-fetched. Reso-
lution 1244 could not deny Kosovo being a province of the Serbian Re-
public under the Yugoslav constitution and, theoretically, Serbia might 
uphold the defunct “shell” of the FRY even after Montenegro’s secession, 
if only because of Kosovo.
Whatever new status awaits Kosovo, it is vital that this arrangement 
does not trigger further rounds of irredentism and territorial claims; al-
lowing Kosovo to merge with Albania would only destabilise Macedonia 
and other states in the region already wrestling with their own ethnic 
problems. Protecting minority rights is the surest means to head off in-
surrections before they begin.
2.3.4. (Future) impact of EU intervention in Kosovo
At fi rst sight, the European Union’s role in Kosovo since 1999 has 
been limited. “Embedded” in the international reconstruction effort, the 
EU acted under the responsibility of the United Nations. Yet, Europe’s 
impact on the ground has been tangible, as the EU and its Member 
States devoted the lion’s share of resources - military, fi nancial, and hu-
man - to repair the damage of war and of decades of under-investment 
and neglect, to increase the capacity of local administration, and foster 
reforms. Unfortunately, paying the bills has not translated into greater 
visibility for the Union. But, this is about to change. The appointment 
by the UN Security Council of Martti Ahtisaari represents one of the fi rst 
occasions since Lord Owen’s rocky involvement in the early phases of 
the Bosnian war that a European has been given such pre-eminence in 
Balkans diplomacy. As noted before, the European Union fully partici-
pates in the status negotiations through its representative Stefan Lehne. 
130 Proceeding Points for a Restructuring of Relations between Serbia and Montenegro, re-
produced in CEPS Europa South-East Monitor, Issue 31, January/February 2002.
131 Strictly speaking, only the unlikely case of Serbia’s secession would have unhinged 
Resolution 1244.
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However, his infl uence (and that of his boss, Javier Solana) is held back 
by a common stance of the Member States on (conditional) independence 
for Kosovo (UK vs. France).
One of the lessons learned from Bosnia is that, unless the chief ne-
gotiator has real powers, many in the Balkans will assume that this per-
son is simply answering to his US deputy or more powerful handlers in 
the White House. It will only take a few times for Ahtisaari to step out of 
the room to get instructions before others around the table begin to think 
they should be negotiating directly with the front offi ce. It is far from clear 
how the Bush administration, which does not seem to like being the jun-
ior partner in anything, will adjust to letting a European take the lead on 
Kosovo. Yet, Washington has enough on its hands right now (Iraq, Iran, 
Afghanistan) and should be happy that Europe has taken greater owner-
ship of Balkan issues. There also continues to be an almost instinctive 
dislike within the White House for European leadership on matters of 
high diplomacy, and a fundamental distrust of Europe’s ability to stick 
to tough positions. It will be Ahtisaari’s challenge to keep the US close 
without creating the image of being Washington’s lapdog.132
If the future for Kosovo is European, then “Europe” should not only 
wield real powers in the fi nal status negotiations, but also in the im-
plementation process. Fortunately, a bigger role for the EU in Kosovo 
looms on the horizon. If and when the fi nal status negotiations lead to 
an agreement on how Belgrade and Priština could peacefully separate 
from each other, with internationally recognised borders, then UNMIK 
would in a fi nal stage have to oversee the transfer of authority from Ko-
sovo’s PISG to institutions established under a political settlement (in 
line with Resolution 1244). The UN Security Council has made it clear 
in the guiding principles it adopted for this process that for some time 
“Kosovo will continue to need an international civilian and military pres-
ence to exercise appropriate supervision of compliance of the provisions 
of the Status settlement, to ensure security and, in particular, protection 
for minorities as well as to monitor and support the authorities in the 
continued implementation of standards.”133 In October 2005, the SGSR 
initiated consultations with a view to preparing a technical assessment 
of the needs for the possible future international involvement in Kosovo, 
without prejudice to the outcome of the future status process.134 This as-
sessment is being conducted by UNMIK together with the EU, OSCE, and 
NATO, as well as with the United Nations funds and agencies and bilat-
132 See J Norris, ‘Kosovo: Get It Right, Now’ Le Monde Diplomatique (12 October 2005).
133 See UN Doc S/2005/709, 10 November 2005.
134 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission 
in Kosovo, UN Doc S/2006/45, 25 January 2006 press para 14.
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eral donors present in Kosovo. It focuses on four main areas: rule of law; 
good governance; democratisation, human rights and minority issues; 
and economic and fi scal issues.
It is believed that NATO, for some time to come, will continue to 
perform the hard-core security task and that the EU will restrict its fu-
ture role in Kosovo to civilian crisis management. In December 2005, the 
General Affairs and External Relations Council of the EU discussed a 
joint report by the SG/HR and the Commission on the Union’s future role 
and contribution in Kosovo.135 The report suggested that the EU should 
take over responsibility for the policing of Kosovo from UNMIK and train 
judges, prosecutors, and prison staff to guarantee the rule of law. The 
report also called for increased aid to Kosovo and talked of a tangible Eu-
ropean prospect, whatever the outcome of the status talks. The Council 
asked the SG/HR and the Commission “to continue examination of these 
issues in coordination with other international actors, particularly in the 
areas of police and the rule of law (including contingency planning for a 
possible ESDP mission), economic development, and fostering Kosovo’s 
European perspective, and to keep the relevant Council bodies actively 
engaged in order to ensure continuing timely preparation of an EU role 
in Kosovo.”136 To this end, a Council/Commission joint mission was dis-
patched to Kosovo in February 2006 and a joint action was adopted by 
the Council on 10 April 2006 to send a planning team charged with de-
signing an EU role in the fi elds of justice, police, and rule of law issues 
and the smooth transition of such selected tasks from UNMIK.137
At the time of writing, the political leaders of the Member States are 
not expected to gather enough courage to let “their” EU enter the high-
risk territory of Kosovo by taking over the military operation from KFOR 
(assuming that the government of Kosovo would actually prefer EU in-
volvement over that of the US within NATO). It seems that in 2006 the 
EU is still doubtful about its own military capabilities. This is a pity, as 
most of the approximately 17,000 KFOR troops are European anyway.138 
Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defence, has indicated that he hopes 
135 See Council Conclusions Press release 14961/05 (Presse 318) 12 December 2005. 
136 Ibid.
137 See Olli Rehn, ‘The Western Balkans’ (speech to the AFET Committee of the Europe-
an Parliament, Brussels, 23 February 2006) SPEECH/06/125; and Council Joint Action 
(CFSP) 2006/304 of 10 April 2006 on the establishment of an EU Planning Team (EUPT 
Kosovo) regarding a possible EU crisis management operation in the fi eld of the rule of law 
and possible other areas in Kosovo [2006] OJ L 112/19.
138 Levels of the 36 troop-contributing nations are available at <http://www.nato.int/kfor>, 
KFOR’s website. See also the monthly reports to the UN on the operations of KFOR, eg UN 
Doc S/2006/167, 15 March 2006, covering the period from 1 November to 31 December 
2005.
244 Steven Blockmans: The Role and Impact of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy...
that US troop levels - currently at 1,700 - could be further reduced.139 A 
reorganisation of the EU’s military involvement in BiH140 and invoking 
the necessary “Berlin Plus” arrangements would enable the European 
Union to seize a historic opportunity and fi nally stand up to the task of 
securing crisis situations on the continent without having to rely on US 
military might.
A fi nal point concerns representation. In the event that the EU in-
deed launches a civilian ESDP mission in Kosovo, it will have to work 
side-by-side with NATO, UN agencies, and the international fi nancial 
institutions. It would benefi t the international community’s goals and 
actions if it were to speak with a single voice. A (double-hatted) EU Spe-
cial Representative could hold this high-profi le post. Again, the lessons 
learned from Bosnia could help shape the position of a future high rep-
resentative for Kosovo.141
3. ESDP operations selon la lettre?
3.1. Bosnia-Herzegovina
3.1.1. EU Police Mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina
On 1 January 2003 the EU launched its fi rst-ever civilian crisis 
management operation within the framework of the ESDP: the EU Po-
lice Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina.142 The EU thereby provided 
a follow-on mission to the United Nations International Police Task Force 
(IPTF). The aim of EUPM, the mandate of which was adjusted and extend-
ed for another two years, is to consolidate the achievements of the IPTF 
and the international community’s work to establish sustainable policing 
139 See D Sevastopulo and D Dombey, ‘Rumsfeld wants to cut US presence in Kosovo’ Fi-
nancial Times (3 February 2006). 
140 As suggested by Günter Platter, the Austrian Minister of Defence, at the informal meet-
ing of EU Defence Ministers on 6-7 March 2006 in Innsbruck. Platter was reported as hav-
ing said that EUFOR Althea could be reduced with 700 troops in the second half of 2006, 
and to 2,500 in the longer term. See ‘EU-vredesmacht Bosnië verkleinen’, NRC Handelsblad 
(7 March 2006). On EUFOR Althea, see below chapter 3.1.2.
141 See G Niessen and J te Velde, ‘In Kosovo is geen plaats voor het Bosnisch model’ (2006) 
60 Internationale Spectator 148-150; and M Karnitschnig, ‘The United Nations and the 
European Union in Kosovo: The Challenges of Joint Nation-building’ in J Wouters, F Hoff-
meister and T Ruys (eds), The United Nations and the European Union: An Ever Stronger 
Partnership (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague 2006), forthcoming.
142 As explained in section 1, the EU had already conducted civilian crisis management 
missions in cooperation with both the WEU and the UN. EUPM was the fi rst operation 
for which the EU alone assumed leadership and responsibility. After having been invited 
thereto in the statement by the President of the Security Council UN Doc S/PRST/2002/33 
(12 December 2002), the EU does, however, report to the Security Council on the activities 
of EUPM. For the most recent report, covering the period from 1 January to 31 December 
2005, see UN Doc S/2006/125 (23 February 2006).
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arrangements under Bosnian ownership in accordance with best Euro-
pean and international standards.143 This overall goal is to be achieved in 
particular through monitoring, mentoring, and inspecting Bosnian police 
at the appropriate level, as well as through training and technical sup-
port.144 Understandably, EUPM does not have a mandate to enact legis-
lation nor to enforce the law in Bosnia-Herzegovina. To possess either 
would be to undermine the principle of an independent, non-politicised 
police service that the international community is seeking to instil ten 
years after the war ended.
At the moment of writing, a total of 34 countries (the 25 EU Member 
States and 9 third countries) contributed to a force of 207 police offi c-
ers and support staff.145 In accordance with Article 25 TEU, the Political 
and Security Committee (PSC, most commonly referred to by its French 
acronym COPS) is tasked to exercise political control and strategic di-
rection of the mission. The Head of Mission/Police Commissioner is in 
operational control of the mission, reporting to the SG/HR through the 
EU Special Representative in Bosnia.146 In order to support the domestic 
police forces in their work, EUPM initially co-located over 400 of its offi c-
143 See Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2002/210 on the European Union Police Mission of 11 
March 2002 [2002] OJ L 70/1, which applied until 31 December 2005; and Council Joint 
Action (CFSP) 2005/824 on the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH) of 24 November 2005 [2005] OJ L 307/55, applicable from 1 January 
2006 to 31 December 2007.
144 Ibid. The total cost of EUPM amounted to 38 million in 2003. See Council Decision 
(CFSP) 2002/968 concerning the implementation of Joint Action (CFSP) 2002/210 on the 
European Union Police Mission, of 10 December 2002 [2002] OJ L 335/1. Member States 
funded 18 million through staff secondment. The remaining 20 million in operational costs 
is fi nanced through the Community budget. The latter fi gure dropped to 17.5 million per 
year in 2004 and 2005.
145 Bulgaria, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Romania, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey, and Ukraine 
have contributed police offi cers to EUPM. The EU has based itself on TEU art 24 to conclude 
agreements with these states on their (forces’) participation in EUPM. For updates in con-
tribution levels, see <http://www.eupm.org>.
146 Sven Christian Frederiksen was appointed Head of Mission by Council Decision (CFSP) 
2002/212 concerning the appointment of the Head of Mission/Police Commissioner of the 
European Union Police Mission (EUPM) of 11 March 2002 [2002] OJ L 70/8. Bartholomew 
Kevin Carty was appointed as his successor by Council Decision (CFSP) 2004/188 of 23 
February 2004 [2004] OJ L 58/27. His mandate was extended until 31 December 2005 
by Council Decision (CFSP) 2005/81 of 31 January 2005 [2005] OJ L 29/48. Carty was 
replaced by Vincenzo Coppola by PSC Decision EUPM/1/2005 ((CFSP) 2005/922) of 25 
November 2005 [2005] OJ L 335/58. On 1 February 2006, Christian Schwarz-Schilling 
(Germany) succeeded Paddy Ashdown (UK) as High Representative and EUSR in BiH. See 
Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2006/49 appointing the European Union Special Rep-
resentative in Bosnia and Herzegovina of 30 January 2006 [2006] OJ L 26/21. Lord 
Ashdown was appointed EUSR to BiH by Council Joint Action of 11 March 2002 on the 
appointment of the EU Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, [2002] OJ L 
70/7. This “double-hatting” greatly facilitated the coordination of the rule of law reform 
programmes between the UN and the EU.
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ers with BiH offi cers at medium and senior levels in all the police forces 
of BiH, i.e. in the police forces of the two entities which make up BiH, the 
Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (FBiH) and Republika 
Srpska (RS), and the independently administered Br ko District.147 It is 
the offi cers’ joint task to implement EUPM’s seven core programmes in 
crime policing, criminal justice, internal affairs, police administration, 
and public order.148 Each programme is implemented through a number 
of concrete projects, such as the Major and Organised Crime project and 
the Fight and Intervention against Human Traffi cking project. In the fi eld 
of internal affairs, one of EUPM’s main tasks is to encourage the domestic 
authorities to deal with cases of non-compliance such as obstruction of 
EUPM, failure to adhere to the terms of the Dayton Agreement, or failure 
to uphold democratic policing principles. Only if the local authorities are 
seen to be failing in their duty to properly apply the disciplinary proce-
dures will the matter be taken up by EUPM. In last instance, the EUPM 
Commissioner can recommend the removal of non-compliant offi cers to 
the HR/EUSR.149 Any offi cer so removed would be barred from any future 
service in the police.150
It is diffi cult to objectively assess how successful EUPM has been in 
the performance of its tasks since its inception. It is very much a ques-
tion of whether one sees the bottle half-full or half-empty. At the 10th an-
niversary of Dayton, travelling outside the remarkably safe and pleasant 
environment of Sarajevo, one gets a sense that Bosnia is settling into a 
sort of normality. People expelled during the war are returning. The cost 
of life is relatively cheap. But while an end to war has brought a peace 
dividend, elections and freedom of expression, it also brought organised 
crime and hard drugs. On the basis of offi cial press releases in the fi rst 
year of operations, it seems that EUPM was “learning by doing”.151 It 
147 The present structure of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established under the 
General Framework Agreement for Peace, initialled in Dayton on 21 November 1995 and 
signed in Paris on 14 December 1995, 35 ILM 1996, at 75.
148 On the activities of the EUPM in BiH, see the Agreement of 4 October 2002 between the 
EU and BiH, annexed to Council Decision (CFSP) 2002/84 concerning the conclusion of the 
Agreement between the European Union and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) on the activi-
ties of the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in BiH of 30 September 2002 [2002] OJ 
L 293/1. In coordination with the HR/EUSR, international organisations in BiH, as well as 
with senior BiH police authorities, EUPM’s fi rst Head of Mission, Police Commissioner Fre-
deriksen, set two priorities for the mission, namely combating organised crime and guaran-
teeing the safe return of refugees and internally displaced persons, particularly those who 
return to an area where the ethnic group to which they belong is in the minority. EUPM’s 
priorities developed over the course of the mission.
149 Para 6 of the Annex to Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2002/210.
150 See C Mace, ‘European Union Security and Defence Policy Comes of Age in the Balkans’, 
(2003) EPC Working Papers <http://www.TheEPC.be>.
151 See also A Nowak, L’Union en action: la mission de police en Bosnie (ISS,Paris 2003).
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increased border security after the assassination of Serbian Prime Min-
ister DjindjiÊ; it raided night clubs after reports of human traffi cking; 
and it increased surveillance after indications of smuggling activity via 
the beaches at Neum (the 12 km long strip between Dubrovnik and Split 
which provides BiH with an entry to the Adriatic). Eight months down 
the road, EUPM acknowledged that the time had come to move beyond 
responding to violent incidents after they have occurred and to formulate 
a security doctrine which would enable it to prevent the eruption of re-
newed violence. A stable and secure environment in Bosnia, underpinned 
by a military presence, was - and still is - an essential element for the 
success of EUPM. At the outset, the EU was dependent on the military 
presence of NATO/SFOR to secure this environment, making close con-
sultation between EUPM on the one hand, and the other international 
actors, in particular SFOR, on the other, imperative to establish the rule 
of law in Bosnia-Herzegovina.152 Procedures were simplifi ed when, on 
2 December 2004, the EU launched EUFOR Althea as a follow-on for 
SFOR.153 But this move did not translate into a qualitative or a quantita-
tive improvement of EUPM’s record. While EUPM was supposed to make 
local police more effi cient crime fi ghters, the International Crisis Group 
found that statistics collected by the entity police forces indicated that 
crime had risen signifi cantly since EUPM’s mandate began.154 The most 
visible failure, however, was the inability of EUPM to conclude an agree-
ment between the various local parties on police reform.155
Substantive police reform was long overdue in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
During the 1992-1995 war, the police were a key instrument of ethnic 
cleansing - particularly in the RS and the Croatian areas of the FBiH.156 
152 To this end, Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2003/188 of 17 March 2003 amending Joint 
Action (CFSP) 2002/210 on the European Union Police Mission [2003] OJ L 73/9 was 
adopted to amend the original mandate of EUPM to give the SG/HR the authorisation 
to release classifi ed information and documents up to the level “CONFIDENTIEL UE” to 
NATO/SFOR, to the host state, and to the third parties associated with the EU Joint Ac-
tion, and up to the level “RESTREINT UE” to the Offi ce of the High Representative, to the 
UN, and to the OSCE.
153 See chapter 3.1.2 below.
154 See ICG, ‘Bosnia’s Stalled Police Reform: No Progress, No EU’ (6 September 2005) Eu-
rope Report,. John Erik Jensen, Chief of Quality Control of EUPM, was reported as having 
said that crime had risen approximately 40 per cent since EUPM began, but that the statis-
tics used by local police agencies were extremely unreliable.
155 The EUPM can claim formation of the State Investigation and Protection Agency, a state-
level police agency, as a success, though one that must be shared with the OHR. The Coun-
cil was proud to devote attention to this fact by publishing, in the fi rst issue of its ESDP 
Newsletter, December 2005, a positive press report on the issue. See ‘Wächter im Splitter-
staat  Süddeutsche Zeitung, (20 October 2005). For a more critical view, see M Merlingen 
and R Ostrauskaite, ‘ESDP Police Missions: Meaning, Context and Operational Challenges’ 
(2005) 10 EFA Rev 215-235.
156 See L Silber and A Little, The Death of Yugoslavia (Penguin Books 1996, London) rev 
ed.
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The war left Bosnia with three police forces: Bosniak, Croat, and Serb, 
each with its own jurisdictions. The fi rst two merged fairly swiftly, at least 
nominally, but police throughout the whole country remained highly po-
liticised, carrying out orders of policy-makers to obstruct implementation 
of the Dayton Peace Accords, in particular refugee return, and heavily 
involved in organised crime. The RS force was fi lled with war criminals 
and actively supported persons indicted by the ICTY.157 While EUPM was 
empowered to request the HR/EUSR to remove obstructionist police of-
fi cers, this has proved such a cumbersome and protracted process that 
the EUPM has never exercised the power.158 For a long time, police reform 
(the structure of the police forces, their fi nancing, and their relationship 
to the courts) remained hopelessly blocked due to obstruction from the 
Serbian side. The leading party in the RS - the Serbian Democratic Party 
(SDS) - openly blocked all efforts at reform and received active encour-
agement from the Serbian government in Belgrade, the Serbian Orthodox 
Church and Serbia’s security structures, which desired to annex Repub-
lika Srpska as part of a Kosovo fi nal status settlement.159 OHR, EUPM, 
and other international agencies in BiH proved incapable of convincing 
the Serbs to cooperate. A narrow interpretation of EUPM’s rather weak 
mandate - to “monitor, mentor and inspect” - did not help to break the 
deadlock. It was not until heavy political pressure was applied on both 
Banja Luka and Belgrade, inter alia by making police reform a necessary 
precondition for BiH to open SAA negotiations with the EU, that the Bos-
nian Serb parliament on 6 October 2005 backed down on blocking a key 
police law.160
Keen to score an early success for its nascent European Security and 
Defence Policy, the Union underestimated both the size and the complex-
ity of the task in Bosnia-Herzegovina. EUPM took over poorly prepared, 
lacking inspiration, and expertise on how to devise a hard-hitting and 
non-negotiable strategy for “Europeanising” the police in BiH. At the end 
of 2005, the Council reassessed the disappointing performance of EUPM 
and used the expiration of EUPM’s mandate on 31 December 2005 to 
replace it with an institution charged, until 31 December 2007, with su-
157 Although the RS government’s Srebrenica Report listed hundreds of individuals who 
took part in that massacre as still active duty offi cers, EUPM did not remove them or other-
wise follow up. See ICG, ‘Bosnia’s Stalled Police Reform: No Progress, No EU’ (6 September 
2005) Europe Report. See, more generally, S Bose, Bosnia After Dayton: Nationalist Partition 
and International Intervention (Hurst & Company, London 2002).
158 See ICG ‘Bosnia’s Stalled Police Reform: No Progress, No EU’ (6 September 2005) Europe 
Report.
159 ICG ‘Bosnia’s Stalled Police Reform: No Progress, No EU’ (6 September 2005) Europe 
Report.
160 See M Beunderman, ‘Bosnia set to follow Croats and Serbs on EU track’ (6 October 
2005).EUObserver.com.
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pervising the implementation of police reform and restructuring, and the 
fi ght against organised crime.161 It seems unlikely that with this marginal 
widening of EUPM’s mandate a robust police mission has been created 
that will remove recalcitrant police offi cials and earn respect in, as well 
as outside, Bosnia-Herzegovina.
3.1.2. EUFOR Althea
At the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002, the EU 
stated its willingness to follow on from a strong NATO-led military opera-
tion in Bosnia-Herzegovina by mid-2004.162 This ambition was re-stated 
by President Chirac and Prime Minister Blair at the Franco-British sum-
mit in Le Touquet in February 2003. SFOR, which operated under a ro-
bust Chapter VII mandate,163 was set up in Bosnia in December 1996 fol-
lowing the Dayton Accords that ended the civil war in the republic. It had 
a mandate to provide security and stability as well as to capture alleged 
war criminals and transfer them to the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague. In June 2004, SFOR con-
sisted of some 7,000 troops (reduced from 40,000 at the start, 33,000 in 
1999, and from 16,000 in 2002 as part of a restructuring exercise), with 
European states contributing the majority of the force.164 Yet, leading an 
operation of this size would certainly represent a major task for the EU. 
The United States had initially given a cautious welcome to the Union’s 
proposal, emphasising the need for a successful initial military operation 
in Macedonia before any takeover from SFOR could be considered. At 
the beginning of June 2003, however, the US put the brakes on the EU’s 
plans to take over the large NATO-led mission, citing security reasons, 
the complexity of the mission, and continuing problems with the transfer 
of war criminals to the ICTY.165 High-level EU diplomats were not easily 
persuaded that, by postponing the take-over by the EU of NATO’s mis-
sion, the US was in fact rendering the Union a favour and not bidding to 
thwart its efforts at giving its ESDP real visibility - which the EU’s third 
military operation certainly would provide.166 Discontentment over the 
161 Art 2 of Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2005/824 on the European Union Police Mission 
(EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) of 24 November 2005 [2005] OJ L 307/55.
162 EU Bull 12-2002, point I.9.29.
163 (1996) S/RES/1088.
164 Data available at SFOR’s website <http://www.nato.int/sfor >. 
165 See <http://www.europeanvoice.com/current/article.asp?id=18147> and J Dempsey in 
N Gnesotto, EU Security and Defence Policy: The First Five Years (1999-2004) (EUISS, Paris 
2004) 199.
166 See J Dempsey, ‘A Case of Overloaded Agendas’ Financial Times (3 June 2003) in which 
the author points to the overloaded agenda from which the EU was suffering at the time: 
it was, inter alia, going through the most ambitious enlargement process in the history of 
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spat between the US and a divided Europe over the latest war in Iraq cer-
tainly fuelled the Union’s eagerness to prove its military capabilities by 
taking over some of the tasks performed by NATO and the UN, especially 
in the nearby Western Balkans. Yet, as most of the region increasingly 
shed its dependency on large international military forces (some 7,000 
NATO-led troops in Bosnia, up to 20,000 in Kosovo, and a few hundred 
in Macedonia) and slowly moved to state- and institution-building, the 
need was growing to have professionally trained police forces capable 
of providing security. It was acknowledged that military missions could 
neither be open-ended nor carried out in isolation of building civilian 
structures. As such, the existing military mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
had to be part of a comprehensive approach in the country, and particu-
larly geared towards providing the necessary security regime to allow for 
the deployment of civilian missions aimed at integrating police forces, 
improving training, and overhauling the judiciary and penal systems.167 
In a decision hailed by the UN Security Council and member states of 
both organisations, NATO announced at its 28-29 June 2004 summit in 
Istanbul that SFOR would be replaced by an EU-led peacekeeping force 
by the end of 2004.168 The motives, however, had less to do with the real 
security situation in BiH than with EU eagerness to bolster its credibility 
as a security actor, and with the desire of the US to declare at least one 
of its long-term military deployments successfully over.
On the surface, EUFOR merely had to pick up where the NATO 
peacekeepers left off: patrolling the country; carrying out weapons collec-
tions; providing reassurance to local people. But the mission also faced 
two key challenges. The fi rst was to deal with the issue of war criminals. 
While NATO managed to arrest 28 people indicted by the ICTY, it sin-
gularly failed to arrest the two people at the top of the most wanted list, 
the former Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzi  and Ratko Mladi . Al-
though NATO maintained a residual military presence comprising a small 
200-strong headquarters in Sarajevo (NHQSa) to advise the government 
of BiH on defence reform, counter-terrorism, and the capture of sus-
pected war criminals, the spotlight was put on EUFOR: could it do better 
in catching the big fi shes? Secondly, EUFOR would have to prove that it 
European integration; it was involved in one of its most intense treaty amendment debates; 
it was working on its own “security doctrine”; and it was already carrying out two military 
operations: “Concordia” in Macedonia and “Artemis” in Bunia (DRC).
167 The 17-18 June 2004 European Council adopted such a comprehensive policy towards 
BiH. See EU Bull 6-2004, point I.12.51.
168 See Istanbul Summit Communiqué issued by the Heads of State and Government
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO Press release (2004)096 28 
June 2004; Summary of remarks by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, 
at the Istanbul NATO summit Istanbul 28 June 2004, S0179/04 and UNSC Res 1551 (9 
July 2004).
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really could carry out a serious peacekeeping mission with thousands of 
troops on the ground. The question was whether the internal structures 
within the EU would allow for such a mission. If so, then EUFOR could 
boost the self-confi dence of the EU in the fi eld of EDSP and lead to the 
launching of similar missions in other trouble spots.
Authorised by UN Security Council Resolution 1575 (2004) for an 
initial planned period of twelve months,169 EUFOR Althea embarked on a 
mission to provide deterrence,170 continued compliance with the Dayton 
Accords, and to contribute to a safe and secure environment in BiH.171 
The handover ceremony from NATO to EU peacekeepers took place at 
Camp Butmir, NATO’s main base near Sarajevo, on 2 December 2004.172 
With the adoption of Resolution 1575 (2004) under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, the Security Council authorised the Member States acting 
through EUFOR to take “all necessary measures” to effect the implemen-
tation of and to ensure compliance with Annexes l-A and 2 of the Day-
ton Peace Accords, and stressed that the parties to those agreements 
would continue to be subject to such enforcement action by EUFOR (and 
NHQSa) as might be necessary to ensure the protection and the defence 
of EUFOR (and the NATO presence). The Resolution thus allowed for the 
use of force as applied by EUFOR troops in the gun battle that ensued 
after they stormed a house in Bosnia to apprehend Bosnian Serb war 
crimes suspect Dragomir Abazovi .173
169 (22 November 2004) S/RES/1575 In para 13, the UNSC expressed its intention to con-
sider the terms of further authorisation as necessary in the light of developments in the 
implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords and the situation in BiH. In para 18, the UNSC 
requested the Member States acting through or in cooperation with the EU (and NATO) to 
report to on the activities of EUFOR (and NHQSa), at least at three-monthly intervals.
170 That is, EUFOR would guarantee the peace by deterring anyone who might try to upset 
it.
171 Council Decision (CFSP) 2004/803 on the launching of the European Union military 
operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina of 25 November 2004 [2004] OJ L 353/21, adopted on 
the basis of TEU art 17, provided the legal basis for the launching of EUFOR Althea. Art 3 
states that, “[w]ithout prejudice to Article 17 of Joint Action (CFSP) 2004/570 this Decision 
shall remain in force until the Council decides to end the EU military operation in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.” For EUFOR Althea’s mission statement, see art 1 of Council Joint Action 
(CFSP) 2004/570 on the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina of 
12 July 2004 [2004] OJ L 252/10. 
172 See Javier Solana, European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, ‘Launch of the EU “ALTHEA” operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ Sarajevo 
(2 December 2004) S0337/04: “Today the EU assumes a new responsibility and commit-
ment: here with the same spirit of generosity and effi ciency as its predecessor from NATO. 
EUFOR will mesh with the EU’s substantial engagement in so many areas: a formidable 
economic commitment, a Police mission deployed, a solid political relationship. All this is 
part of the journey to the only possible direction: the EU institutions.” 
173 See T Küchler, ‘EU troops kill wife of Bosnian war crimes suspect’ (6 January 2006) 
EUObserver.com.
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In terms of operation and command, the PSC, under the responsibil-
ity of the Council, is tasked to exercise political control and strategic di-
rection of the military operation. The Council authorised the PSC to take 
the relevant decisions in accordance with Article 25 TEU.174 This authori-
sation included the powers to take further decisions on the appointment 
of the EU Operation Commander and/or the EU Force Commander, to 
amend the planning documents, including the operation plan, the chain 
of command, and the rules of engagement. The powers of decision with 
respect to the objectives and termination of EUFOR, however, remained 
vested in the Council, assisted by the SG/HR. As part of the 1999 “Ber-
lin Plus” arrangement, EUFOR draws on NATO assets and capabilities 
for Althea.175 The EU Operational Headquarters (EU OHQ) at Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, oversees 
EUFOR Althea. The EU OHQ draws on EU and NATO staff. The EU Com-
mand Element at NATO’s Joint Forces Command, Naples in Italy and the 
EUFOR HQ at Camp Butmir in Sarajevo have control of the operation, 
reporting to EU OHQ. On 24 July 2004, Admiral Rainer Feist (Germany), 
NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander for Europe (D-SACEUR), was 
appointed EU Operation Commander,176 but he was succeeded (in both 
posts) by General John Reith (UK) before he could even start working 
for EUFOR.177 The EU Military Committee (EUMC) monitors the proper 
execution of the EU military operation conducted under the responsi-
bility of the EU Operation Commander.178 Major General David Leakey 
(UK) was appointed as the fi rst EU Force Commander.179 On 5 December 
2005, he was replaced by Major General Gian Marco Chiarini (Italy).180 
The EU Force Commander maintains contact with the local authorities, 
in close coordination with the HR/EUSR, on issues relevant to his mis-
sion.181 Without prejudice to the chain of command, the EU Commanders 
coordinate closely with the HR/EUSR with a view to ensure consistency 
of the EU military operation with the broader context of the international 
community’s activities in BiH.182 At the moment of writing, a total of 33 
174 Art 6(1) of Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2004/570.
175 Art 1(3) of Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2004/570.
176 Art 2 of Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2004/570.
177 PSC Decision BiH/2/2004 of 24 September 2004 on the appointment of an EU Op-
eration Commander for the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(CFSP) 2004/733 [2004] OJ L 324/22.
178 Art 8(1) of Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2004/570.
179 Art 4 of Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2004/570.
180 PSC Decision BiH/6/2005 (CFSP) 2005/483 on the appointment of an EU Force Com-
mander for the European Union Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina of 14 June 
2005 [2005] OJ L 173/14.
181 Art 9 of Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2004/570.
182 Art 10 of Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2004/570.
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countries (22 EU Member States and 11 third countries) contributed to 
a force of 6,200 troops who operated under the renewed UN Chapter VII 
mandate of Security Council resolution 1639 (2005).183 In accordance 
with Article 28(3) TEU, the operational expenditure for EUFOR Althea is 
paid through contributions by Member States to a fi nancial mechanism 
(ATHENA) based on GDP.184
It is now more than a year since EUFOR took over from SFOR in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The transition from SFOR to EUFOR was seamless 
and did not result in a security-gap. Thanks to its operational set-up and 
the symbiotic relationship with NATO and the rest of the “EU family” in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, EUFOR has managed to establish its credibility and 
robustness from the outset.185 A good start was crucial for the consolida-
tion of the European Union’s ESDP, as EUFOR Althea is its most ambi-
tious and signifi cant operation within that framework. With more than 
6,000 personnel, EUFOR Althea is not only the largest EU military mis-
sion to date,186 it is also part of a comprehensive endeavour to give Bos-
nia-Herzegovina a perspective for EU membership.187 The immediate goal 
183 See EU Council Secretariat, ‘Factsheet on EU military operation in Bosnia and Herze-
govina (Operation EUFOR - Althea)’, (ATH/07 (update 7) December 2005). See PSC De-
cision BiH/5/2004 of 3 November 2004 amending Decision BiH/1/2004 on the accept-
ance of third states’ contributions to the European Union military operation in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Decision BiH/3/2004 on the setting-up of the Committee of Con-
tributors for the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (CFSP) 
2004/822 [2004] OJ L 357/39. Albania, Argentina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Morocco, New 
Zealand, Norway, Romania, Switzerland, and Turkey have contributed troops. The EU has 
based itself on TEU art 24 to conclude agreements on the participation of some of these 
third states’ forces in EUFOR. See eg Council Decision (CFSP) 2005/593 concerning the 
conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Chile on the 
participation of the Republic of Chile in the European Union military crisis management 
operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation ALTHEA) of 18 July 2005 [2005] OJ L 
202/39. Denmark, Cyprus, and Malta have not contributed troops. In conformity with art 6 
of the Protocol on the position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam, C 340/101 
[1997] OJ 1997, Denmark does not participate in the elaboration and implementation of 
decisions and actions of the EU which have defence implications. Therefore, Denmark does 
not participate in the implementation of Joint Action (CFSP) 2004/570, nor in the fi nanc-
ing of the operation. Under the “Berlin Plus” arrangements, Cyprus and Malta are excluded 
from taking part in EU military operations using NATO assets and capabilities. See chapter 
3.2.1 below. The neutral EU countries of Finland, Sweden, and Ireland have contributed 
troops to EUFOR Althea. Major troop contributions come from Germany (1,014), Italy (955), 
the UK (706) and France (402).
184 Art 12 of Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2004/570. On ATHENA, see Council Decision 
(CFSP) 2004/197 establishing a mechanism to administer the fi nancing of the common 
costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications of 23 February 
2004 [2004] OJ L 63/68.
185 See a happy J Solana, ‘Foreword’ (2 December 2005) EUFOR FORUM.
186 The two military operations which the EU carried out prior to launching EUFOR Althea, 
“Concordia” (FYROM) and “Artemis” (DRC), consisted of 400 and 1,400 troops respectively.
187 See Remarks of Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, at the EUFOR 
Change of Command Ceremony, Sarajevo (6 December 2005) S402/05: “This comprehen-
sive approach is what modern crisis management is all about.”
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of Operation Althea was to contribute to maintaining a secure environ-
ment for the implementation of the Dayton Accords. In this respect, EU-
FOR Althea has proved to be a success. As part of its operations, EUFOR 
has conducted searches of companies suspected of pursuing activities in 
contravention of the Dayton Accords and it has conducted operations to 
disrupt illegal activities by those involved in organised crime. EUFOR has 
also supported de-mining operations and regularly carries out weapons 
collection activities across the country. Cooperating closely with EUPM, 
EUFOR put pressure on criminal networks.188 By doing so, it has also 
helped to disrupt support to ICTY indictees.189 In short, EUFOR’s activi-
ties have helped to create the conditions under which Bosnia-Herzegovina 
was able to make progress in several important respects. For example, in 
September 2005, the RS and the FBiH agreed on a long debated military 
reform; a number of weeks later they agreed on the issue of police reform. 
This progress has been rewarded with the opening of negotiations on a 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU. However, as noted 
when discussing the role of EUPM, much progress is still to be made. 
However stable BiH is, potential for instability still exists: the country 
is awash with weapons; the three constituent peoples do not all share a 
common vision of the future and that is evident in daily politics which are 
driven by nationalistic agendas; and progress towards self-sustainability 
is signifi cantly hindered by widespread organised crime and corruption 
which deeply intermingle with public life. The reform agenda, including 
the defence and police reforms, still needs to be implemented. In 2006, 
a new multi-ethnic professional army under a central general staff and 
one defence ministry at the federal level will be created. The new army 
will replace the military structures of the BiH entities. As the reform of 
the BiH Armed Forces and the build up of the BiH security sector con-
tinues, EUFOR (in cooperation with NHQSa) will have to stand ready to 
hand over more and more of its responsibilities to BiH. The cooperation 
with ICTY must continue and be enhanced. Karadi  and Mladi  are still at 
large. Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute 
a threat to international peace and security, the UN Security Council was 
188 Asked what had been the main shortcomings of EUFOR in its fi rst year of operations, 
Major General Leakey, Commander of the force, mentioned that in supporting the fi ght 
against organised crime, EUFOR very much had to learn by doing: “This new task has 
been demanding for everyone, from the soldiers on the ground to myself. Nevertheless, all 
EUFOR personnel have performed extremely well in this regard.” Leakey also admitted that 
in running a multinational headquarters as effi ciently as possible, one needs to overcome 
practical challenges such as language, different cultures and modus operandi. “But I be-
lieve that EUFOR has, again, risen to the challenge successfully.” See ‘Interview with Major 
General David Leakey, Commander of the stabilisation force (EUFOR)’ 1 ESDP Newsletter 
(2005) 23.
189 Information available at EUFOR’s website <http://www.euforbih.org>. See also N Haw-
ton, ‘Forces target Karadzic “network”’, BBC News (15 March 2006).
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therefore right, by adopting Resolution 1639 (2005), to extend EUFOR’s 
robust Chapter VII mandate for a further period of twelve months.190
3.2. Macedonia
3.2.1. Operation Concordia
As part of the larger commitment of the European Union to Macedo-
nia,191 the Union deployed its inaugural military operation to contribute 
further to a stable and secure environment in the country. On 31 March 
2003, the EU launched Operation Concordia to ensure the follow-up from 
NATO’s operation “Allied Harmony”.192 The European Union had hoped to 
take over from NATO in Macedonia as soon as the mandate of the Alli-
ance’s operation “Amber Fox” came to an end in December 2002.193 How-
ever, the EU-led operation could not go ahead until an agreement was 
reached with Turkey, within NATO, on EU access to NATO assets and 
capabilities (the so-called “Berlin Plus” arrangements). The negotiations 
between the EU and Turkey were deadlocked for months, until a break-
through fi nally came on 12 December 2002, when the European Council 
of Copenhagen agreed that “Berlin Plus arrangements” and the implemen-
tation thereof would “only apply to those EU Member States which are 
also either NATO members or parties to NATO’s ‘Partnership for Peace’, 
and which have consequently concluded bilateral security agreements 
with NATO”.194 This formulation, which effectively excludes Cyprus (and 
Malta) from taking part in EU military operations using NATO assets, was 
suffi cient to overcome Turkish objections and secure access to NATO as-
sets.195 At the same summit, the European Council confi rmed the Union’s 
readiness to take over the military operation in Macedonia as soon as 
possible, in consultation with NATO.196 The European Council invited the 
relevant EU bodies to fi nalise work on the overall approach to the opera-
tion, including development of military options and relevant plans. The 
190 (21 November 2005) S/RES/1639.
191 See chapter 2.1 above.
192 See Council Decision (CFSP) 2003/202 relating to the launch of the EU military opera-
tion in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia of 18 March 2003 [2003] OJ 76/43.
193 See EU Bull 6-2002, point I.7.14.
194 EU Bull 12-2002, points I.9.27 and I.17.
195 The fi nalisation of the “Berlin Plus” arrangements was concluded with the signing of 
a Security of Information Agreement between the EU and NATO on 14 March 2003. See 
Council Decision (CFSP) 2003/211 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between 
the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation on the Security of Informa-
tion of 24 February 2003 [2003] OJ L 80/35. The Agreement itself is not publicly accessible. 
For backgrounds and analysis, see M Reichard, (n 13).
196 EU Bull 12-2002, point I.9.28.
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Union’s wish eventually became reality at the end of March 2003. A total 
of 27 countries (13 EU Member States197 and 14 non-EU countries198) 
contributed to a force of 350 soldiers plus 50 support staff.199
It is worth pointing out that the Irish government decided that it was 
unable to contribute personnel to Concordia due to the lack of explicit UN 
Security Council authorisation for the operation.200 Indeed, without refer-
ring to its legal basis in the UN Charter or determining the situation in 
Macedonia a threat to international peace and security, Security Council 
Resolution 1371 (2001), the single non-EU basis for the adoption of Joint 
Action 2003/92/CFSP on the establishment of Concordia,201 called for 
the full implementation of Resolution 1345 (2001) and further simply wel-
comed international efforts, including those of the OSCE, EU, and NATO, 
in cooperation with the Macedonian government, and other States, “to 
prevent the escalation of ethnic tensions in the area and to facilitate the 
full implementation of the Framework Agreement, thus contributing to 
peace and stability in the region.”202 Resolution 1345 (2001) had done not 
much more than to call on states and appropriate international organisa-
tions to consider how they could best give practical help to efforts in the 
region to strengthen democratic, multiethnic societies and to assist the 
return of displaced persons (para. 11).203 The legal basis for the adoption 
of this resolution was also elusive, but like Resolution 1371 (2001) it re-
called Resolution 1244 (1999) on Kosovo, which had determined that the 
197 Denmark, for reasons already mentioned (n 183), did not participate in the elaboration, 
implementation, and fi nancing of Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2003/92 on the European 
Union military operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia of 27 January 2003 
[2003] OJ L 34/26. In accordance with TEU art 28(3), the operational expenditure arising 
from the Joint Action having military implications were charged to the Member States ac-
cording to a formula based on GDP. Such costs totalled 6.2 million. The remaining costs 
were funded by participating states on a “costs lie where they fall” basis.
198 Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Nor-
way, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Turkey.
199 The status of the EU-led forces in the FYROM was the subject of an agreement between 
the EU and the government of the Macedonia, concluded on the basis of TEU art. 24. See 
Council Decision (CFSP) 2003/222 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between 
the European Union and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the status of the 
European Union-led Forces (EUF) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia of 21 
March 2003 [2003] OJ L 82/45, to which the so-called SOFA is annexed.
200 Nevertheless, Ireland did contribute to the mission’s joint costs and played a full role 
in the Committee of Contributors. See PSC Decision FYROM/1/2003 on the setting-up of 
the Committee of Contributors for the European Union Military Operation in the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia of 18 February 2003 [2003] OJ L 62/1.
201 Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2003/92 preamble, recital 4.
202 (26 September 2001) S/RES/1371.
203 (21 March 2001) S/RES/1345. The resolution also called on all states in the region to 
respect each other’s territorial integrity and to cooperate on measures that foster stability 
and promote regional political, economic cooperation in accordance with the UN Charter, 
the basic principles of the OSCE, and the Stability Pact for South East Europe (para 12).
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situation “in the region” constituted a threat to international peace and 
security and gave NATO a Chapter VII mandate to deploy KFOR troops. 
While Ireland was probably right in insisting that Resolution 1244 (1999), 
adopted in the wake of NATO’s armed intervention in Kosovo, could not 
serve as an appropriate legal basis for the deployment of an EU-peace-
keeping mission in neighbouring Macedonia in 2003, it could hardly use 
this argument not to contribute troops to Operation Concordia. After all, 
the EU (supposedly) acted on the explicit request of the Macedonian gov-
ernment, not the other way around.204
As said at the beginning, the aim of Operation Concordia was to 
contribute further to a stable and secure environment to allow the Mac-
edonian government to implement the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement 
so as to arrive at a situation where an international security presence 
was no longer needed. The command and control arrangements for Op-
eration Concordia were drawn up in accordance with the “Berlin Plus” 
arrangements so as to create an EU chain of command which recognised 
the need for coordination with NATO.205 Admiral Rainer Feist, Deputy Su-
preme Allied Commander for Europe (D-SACEUR),206 was appointed the 
fi rst EU Operation Commander.207 The Council appointed Brigadier-Gen-
eral Pierre Maral (France) as EU Force Commander.208 One of his tasks 
was to maintain contact with local authorities on issues relevant to his 
mission. Javier Solana and Alexis Brouhns (the EUSR in Macedonia at 
the time), each within their mandates, acted as primary points of contact 
with the Macedonian authorities for matters relating to the implementa-
tion of Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP.209
204 The Macedonian President Trajkovski is supposed to have sent a formal invitation letter 
to the SG/HR on 17 January 2003. See Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2003/92 preamble, 
recital 5. But proof of the existence of this letter could not be found. On 13 March 2003, the 
SG/HR allegedly received a further letter from President Trajkovski, inviting the European 
Union to launch an operation in Macedonia. See Council Decision (CFSP) 2003/202 pre-
amble, recital 1. Proof of the existence of this letter could also not be found.
205 Arts. 1-5, 7, 8, 10, and 11 of Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2003/92. It serves little pur-
pose to repeat the arrangements here. They have been described in detail when discussing 
EUFOR Althea. See chapter 3.1.2 above. It should be emphasised, however, that the com-
mand and control arrangements for Althea were copied from those for Operation Concordia. 
See also C Mace, ‘European Union Security and Defence Policy Comes of Age in the Bal-
kans, (2003) EPC Working Papers <http://www.TheEPC.be>.
206 See chapter 3.1.2 above.
207 Art 2 of Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2003/92. 
208 See Council Press release 6158/03 (Presse 38) 7 February 2003. Maral was replaced by 
Major General Luís Nelson Ferreira dos Santos (Portugal) as of 1 October 2003. On that 
date Concordia took over from France the responsibilities at the force s headquarters level. 
See art 2 of Council Decision (CFSP) 2003/563 on the extension of the European Union 
military operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia of 29 July 2003 [2003] 
OJ L 190/20.
209 Art 6 of Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2003/92.
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In terms of crisis management, the European Union has fared well 
in the case of Macedonia. Building on the successes of three NATO opera-
tions in the country (Essential Harvest, Amber Fox, and Allied Harmony), 
Operation Concordia provided continuity by carrying out classical peace-
keeping tasks such as patrolling Macedonia’s crisis areas, mostly near the 
Kosovo border.210 While it is true that, overall, the situation in Macedonia 
was relatively straightforward when compared to other Balkan confl icts, 
the security situation in the country remained nevertheless precarious. 
Incidents which took place at the beginning of 2003 and that apparently 
were the work of ethnic Albanian extremists unhappy with the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement had served as a reminder of the potential for a 
resurgence of ethnic violence Macedonia.211 Although Concordia was a 
relatively small force, its deployment was an important fi rst test for both 
the Union’s military crisis management capabilities and the “Berlin Plus” 
arrangements. On both accounts, the EU booked success. Concordia’s 
deployment heralded a period of normalisation and stabilisation. Initially 
expected to last for a period of six months,212 the Council on 29 July 2003 
agreed to extend Operation Concordia for one additional period until 15 
December 2003, in line with the request made to the EU by the President 
of Macedonia.213 This shows the level of confi dence which the Macedo-
nian government had in the EU as a crisis-manager. Or perhaps it was 
the SG/HR who bought extra preparation time by convincing Trajkovski 
to wait until the end of the year before the EU’s fi rst-ever military mission 
would be transformed into a police mission.214
3.2.2. EUPOL Proxima
On 15 December 2003, a ceremony and a military parade in Sko-
pje marked the offi cial end of Operation Concordia. Immediately after-
210 For an overview of Concordia’s activities, see Concordia’s website <http://www.delmkd.
cec.eu.int/en/Concordia/main.htm>.
211 See eg T Stojcevski, ‘Abductions rattle Macedonians’ (6 January 2003) IWPR Balkan Cri-
sis Report No 395; T Stojcevski, ‘Lions menace ends’ (28 January 2003), IWPR Balkan Crisis 
Report No. 401; T Stojcevski, ‘Militants threaten with renewed confl ict’ (3 February 2003) 
IWPR Balkan Crisis Report No 403,; and T Stojcevski, ‘“Extremists” target Macedonians’ 
homes’ (28 February 2003) IWPR Balkan Crisis Report No 410.
212 Art 3 of Council Decision (CFSP) 2003/202.
213 Council Decision (CFSP) 2003/563 on the extension of the European Union military op-
eration in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia of 29 July 2003 [2003] OJ L 190/20, 
refers to Trajkovski’s letter of 4 July 2003, addressed to the SG/HR, whereby the President 
invited the EU to extend Operation Concordia until 15 December 2003 with the existing 
mandate and legal framework.
214 Already ten weeks after the EU launched Operation Concordia, President Trajkovski 
suggested that the force be transformed into one that advises on border controls and the 
police. See E Jansson, ‘Macedonia Seeks Greater Role for Balkans’,Financial Times (9 June 
2003).
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wards, the opening ceremony of the EU Police Mission in Macedonia 
(EUPOL Promixa) took place at the mission’s new headquarters. Javier 
Solana spoke on both occasions.215 The SG/HR put the emphasis in both 
speeches on the continued engagement of the EU in Macedonia, a coun-
try which had moved from a situation were the main threat to stability 
was no longer armed confl ict but criminality. Hence the need to shift the 
emphasis in the EU’s support actions from the military to the police.
Upon the invitation of Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski,216 the 
EU assumed responsibility for its second-ever police mission in the 
framework of the ESDP - its fourth ESDP mission of 2003. “Proxima” 
was launched for an initial period of 12 months.217 A planning team had 
been preparing its operations since 1 October 2003.218 As part of the 
wider Stabilisation and Association Process aimed at strengthening the 
rule of law in the region, Proxima aimed to support Macedonian efforts 
in moving closer towards the EU. In particular, Proxima’s aim was to 
consolidate public confi dence in policing by monitoring, mentoring, and 
advising the local police, and thus help to fi ght organised crime more ef-
fectively. “Proxima” would achieve this goal by a comprehensive reform of 
the Ministry of the Interior, including the creation of a border police and 
the development of an effi cient and professional police service living up to 
European standards of policing - as required within the implementation 
of the Ohrid Framework Agreement.219 To this end, 35 states (the 15 EU 
Member States, the 10 Acceding Countries, the 3 Candidate Countries 
at the time, and 7 third states220) contributed to a 200 man-strong police 
mission that was placed under the day-to-day supervision of Head of Mis-
sion/Police Commissioner Bart D’Hooge, who had also acted as the Police 
Head of Mission/Head of the Planning Team.221 He had to report to the 
215 Javier Solana, ‘EU High Representative for CFSP, attends ceremonies for termina-
tion of Operation Concordia and launch of Mission Proxima’, (Skopje 15 December 2003) 
S0256/03.
216 The invitation letter dated 16 September 2003.
217 Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2003/681 on the European Union Police Mission in the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) of 29 September 2003 [2003] OJ L 
249/66.
218 The planning team was foreseen by arts 1 and 2 of Council Joint Action (CFSP) 
2003/681.
219 Art 3 of Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2003/681.
220 Canada, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the US.
221 Council Decision (CFSP) 2003/682 concerning the appointment of the Head of Mission/
Police Commissioner of the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) in the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia of 29 September 2003 [2003] OJ L 249/70. In accordance with art 
13 of Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2003/681 the Council adopted - by written procedure 
and on the basis of TEU art 24 - a decision concerning the conclusion of the Agreement 
between the European Union and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the sta-
tus and activities of the European Union Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
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SG/HR through the EUSR.222 As with other ESDP operations, the PSC 
provided political control and strategic direction. Uniformed police per-
sonnel was seconded by the Member States.223 Offi cers were co-located at 
appropriate levels in Skopje, Tetovo, Kumanovo, Gostivar, and Ohrid.224
EUPOL Proxima was extended by one year in response to a request 
of the Macedonian Prime Minister Hari Kosotov on 1 October 2004.225 
Brigadier General Jürgen Scholz was appointed as D’Hooge’s replace-
ment.226 Under the political guidance of the EUSR in Skopje, Ambassador 
Michael Sahlin, and in partnership with the local authorities, Proxima 
police experts continued to monitor, mentor, and advise the country’s po-
lice, focusing on middle and senior management. It also further assisted 
in the creation of a border police service. In its second year of activities, 
EUPOL Proxima focused its activities on urgent operational needs within 
three programmes: “Public Peace and Order”, “Organised Crime”, and 
“Border Police”. As a consequence, the mission expanded its geographical 
coverage to a country-wide deployment, while maintaining a higher pres-
ence in the former crisis area.
The European Union’s second ESDP police-mission was successfully 
terminated on 9 December 2005.227 The closing of EUPOL Proxima pre-
ceded the decision of the 15-16 December European Council to award 
candidate country status to Macedonia as a reward for the “signifi cant 
progress” it had made in the previous years towards meeting the political 
Macedonia (EUPOL Proxima) [2004] OJ L 16/66. The Agreement included, where appropri-
ate, the privileges, immunities, and further guarantees necessary for the completion and 
smooth functioning of the police mission. The Head of Mission had to sign a contract with 
the Commission. See art 5(2) of Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2003/681.
222 The SG/HR gave guidance to the Head of Mission/Police Commissioner through the 
EUSR. Art 7 of Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2003/681.
223 Each Member State had to bear the costs related to the police offi cers seconded by it, in-
cluding salaries, medical coverage, allowances other than per diems, and travel expenses to 
and from Macedonia. See art 6(2) of Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2003/681 All police offi cers 
remained under full command of the appropriate national authority. National authorities 
transferred operational control to the Head of Mission (art 5(3)).
224 For an overview of the operational challenges faced by Proxima, see M Merlingen and R 
Ostrauskaite, ‘ESDP Police Missions: Meaning, Context and Operational Challenges’ (2005) 
10 EFA Rev. 213-235.
225 Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2004/789 on the extension of the European Union Police 
Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL PROXIMA) of 22 November 
2004 [2004] OJ L 348/40.
226 PSC Decision PROXIMA/2/2004 of 30 November 2004 concerning the appointment of 
the Head of Mission of the EU Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
EUPOL Proxima (EC) 2004/846 [2004] OJ L 367/29.
227 Statement by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for CFSP, on the occasion of the 
ceremony marking the end of the EU Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Skopje, (9 December 2005) S406/05.
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criteria for EU membership.228 Thus, the European Union’s relationship 
with Macedonia was moved from post-crisis stabilisation to pre-accession 
integration. 
3.2.3. EUPAT
The end of EUPOL Proxima did not signify the end of EU support to 
the broader rule-of-law area in Macedonia. With the establishment of the 
EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT), the EU continued its efforts in sup-
porting local authorities in police reform.229 EUPAT was launched on 15 
December 2005 for a single period of six months.230
The main objective of EUPAT was to help the Macedonian government 
to modernise police structures, a priority reform area for further progress 
towards the EU.231 The team consisted of 30 experts seconded from EU 
Member States,232 who acted under the day-to-day leadership of Briga-
dier General Scholz, whose stay in Macedonia was thereby prolonged.233 
Scholz, in turn, acted under the guidance of EUSR Erwan Fouéré and in 
partnership with the Macedonian authorities.234 Very much like the staff 
from its predecessor Proxima, EUPAT experts monitored and advised the 
Macedonian police (primarily middle and senior levels of management) in 
fi elds spanning border management, public order, and the fi ght against 
corruption and organised crime. EUPAT put emphasis on the implemen-
tation of police reforms, cooperation between the police and judiciary, 
228 EU Bull 12-2005, points I.12.23 and 24. 
229 During consultations with the EU, the Macedonian government had indicated that it 
would welcome, under certain conditions, a police mission to bridge the gap between the 
end of EUPOL Proxima and a planned project funded by CARDS aiming at providing techni-
cal assistance in the fi eld.
230 Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2005/826 on the establishment of an EU Police Advisory 
Team (EUPAT) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM) of 24 November 2005 
[2005] OJ L 307/61.
231 Art 1(2) of Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2005/826.
232 Art 5(4) of Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2005/826. The staff comprised both EU police 
offi cers and civilian experts (including law enforcement monitors), assisted by 20 national 
staff. The headquarters for the Head of EUPAT and his staff were in Skopje, while EUPAT 
mobile units were co-located in Skopje, Tetovo, Ohrid, Bitola, and Stip, thereby covering 
all police regions. The necessary arrangements were made regarding the extension of the 
Agreement between the European Union and Macedonia on the status and activities of the 
EUPOL Proxima to EUPAT.
233 PSC Decision EUPAT/1/2005 concerning the appointment of the Head of the EU Police 
Advisory Team Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM), EUPAT of 7 
December 2005 [2005] OJ L 346/46.
234 Under the terms of Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2005/724 of 17 October 2005 [2005] OJ 
L 272/26, Fouéré was appointed EUSR. Fouéré was also appointed Head of the Commis-
sion’s Delegation in Skopje.
262 Steven Blockmans: The Role and Impact of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy...
professional standardisation, and internal control.235 The EU set aside 
1.5 million for this mission in Macedonia.236
When EUPAT’s mandate ended on 14 June 2006, it handed over to 
a European Commission funded CARDS project that would continue to 
provide police advisors at central and local level. This evolution shows 
how far Macedonia has come in just fi ve years. It also illustrates the 
EU’s ability to adapt its different tools to specifi c situations, with specifi c 
needs. The European Union began by taking over a military operation 
from NATO, it continued with an ESDP police mission, and followed up 
with EUPAT and the European Commission projects.
4. Concluding remarks
The European Union has come a long way in the Western Balkans in 
just a few years. Where, in the 1990s, the EU stood by and watched the 
Balkans burn, it was the United States, within NATO, that had to put the 
fi re out. In the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis, the Union fi nally found its 
voice to say no to violent confl ict in the heart of Europe. In Macedonia, 
the European Union for the fi rst time acted quickly and in a unifi ed way 
to head off the plunge into inter-ethnic warfare. Thanks to the heavy in-
volvement of its SG/HR Javier Solana, and with the support of NATO and 
OSCE, the EU brokered the Ohrid Framework Agreement (2001), which 
defi ned the roadmap towards a new inter-ethnic arrangement in Macedo-
nia. The creation of the state union of Serbia and Montenegro marked a 
second important feat for the European Union and its SG/HR. The Bel-
grade Agreement has served its purpose to cool down tensions and lay 
down the criteria for an internationally acceptable separation of the two 
republics. In both cases, however, yesterday’s diplomatic triumph could 
still become a Pyrrhic victory tomorrow due to the fragility of the arrange-
ments and the volatility of political aspirations. The same goes for Kos-
ovo, the fi nal status of which is now under discussion. Here, the EU has 
a minimal role to play in the negotiating process, while it will probably 
carry all but the military responsibilities in the implementation phase. It 
seems that, for all the talk about the EU speaking with a single voice, po-
litical dissonances make it impossible for the SG/HR and his representa-
tive in the political process to play a bigger role. Similarly, the political 
leaders of the Member States consider the European military capacity 
too fragile still to back up words with force in the high-risk territory of 
Kosovo. In the last fi ve years, the EU has taken its fi rst careful steps in 
the fi eld of the European Security and Defence Policy with the launch-
ing of its fi rst-ever police and military missions. Macedonia and Bosnia-
235 Art 2 of Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2005/826.
236 Art. 8 of Council Joint Action (CFSP) 2005/826.
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Herzegovina have served as a good testing ground to make forthcoming 
ESDP missions a success. Lessons learned from these operations could 
be taken to heart when the EU decides to embark on its future missions, 
in Kosovo and further afi eld. In a way, it is a pity that the EU lacks the 
common will to take on the military challenge in Kosovo. A reorganisation 
of the EU’s military involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina and invoking the 
necessary “Berlin Plus” arrangements would enable the European Union 
to seize a historic opportunity and fi nally stand up to the task of securing 
crisis situations on the continent without having to rely on US military 
might. The Western Balkans may offer the European Union’s one and 
only chance to develop credible and lasting foreign policy, security, and 
defence arrangements.
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